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CHRISTIANITY AND ISLAM: PAST AND PRESENT

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The religion now known as Islam approximates the preaching of Muhammed about as closely as modern Catholicism or Protestant Christianity does the teaching of Jesus. The simple beliefs of the prophet and his contemporaries are separated by a long course of development from the complicated religious system which Islam now presents to us. This course of development was greatly influenced by Christianity, and Christian ideas had from the start operated upon Muhammed's intellectual life. We must attempt to understand the working of his mind, if we wish to understand the original position of Islam with regard to Christianity.

When Muhammed proceeded to compare the great religions of the Old and New Testament with the superficial pietism of his own compatriots, he was especially impressed with the seriousness of the Hebrews and Christians which contrasted strongly with the indifference of the heathen Arabs. The Arab was familiar with the conception of an Almighty God, and this idea had not even been obscured by the worship of trees, stones, fire and the heavenly bodies; but his reverence for this God was somewhat impersonal and he felt no instinctive desire to approach Him, unless driven by hope or fear. The idea of a reckoning between man and God was alien to the Arab mind. Christianity and Judaism influenced Muhammed especially on

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this point. The idea of the day of judgment, when an account of earthly deeds and misdeeds will be required, when the virtuous will be admitted to the joys of Paradise and the wicked will be cast into the fiery abyss, suddenly filled Muhammed's mind and roused him from a conventional indifference.

Polytheism was incompatible with the idea of God as a supreme, righteous but merciful judge and monotheism was thus undissolubly connected with Muhammed's first religious impulse, though this doctrine did not at once assume the polemical form in which it afterwards confronted the old Arabian and Christian beliefs. Even when stirred by religious emotion, the mind of Muhammed rose to the height of his prophetic power only after a long course of development, the exact details of which will forever escape precise definition. Christianity and Judaism had the sacred books which their founders had produced and in these the words of God were transmitted through Moses to the Jews and through Jesus to the Christians. Jesus and Moses had been God's ambassadors to the Jews and Christians and Muhammed raised the question: Who then could bring to the Arabs the glad tidings which should guide them to the happy fields of Paradise? His answer was: "Be ye converted, for the day of judgment is at hand: God has declared it unto me, as he declared it unto Moses and Jesus. I am the apostle of God to you Arabs. Salvation is yours only if ye submit to the will of God preached by me." Muhammed called this act of submission Islam. At the hour of Islam's birth therefore, before its founder had formulated his teaching, the influence of Christianity is indisputable.

Muhammed regarded Judaism and Christianity as religious movements purely national in character. God in His mercy had announced his will to different nations through His prophets. As God's word had been specially interpreted to the Jews and Christians, so ought there to be a special interpretation for the benefit of the Arabs. These interpretations were naturally identical in manner and differed only as regards place and time. Muhammed had heard of the Jewish Messiah and of the Christian Paraclete, and, failing to identify the latter with the Holy Ghost, he identified himself with this figure as one who should come after Moses and Jesus.

To trace in detail the development of his attiude towards Christianity is a more difficult task. At first he assumed the identity of the

two religions but later he evolved a theory of progressive revelation of which the principal stages were marked by the appearance of Adam, Abraham, Moses, Jesus and Muhammed. Each of these revelations had either been confirmed or abrogated by its successor. In spite of the fact that each had been given to a different nation, Muhammed regarded all preceding prophets in the light of his own experience. They had all been first sent to people who refused them a hearing and had been punished in consequence while the prophet found a body of believers elsewhere. An inconsistency arose in Muhammed's teaching at this point through his tendency to confuse these temporary punishments with the final Judgment: but this was not the only instance in which Muhammed's system was not clearly thought out. A further modification of Christian views was his theory, that although prophets were only men, their earthly careers were invariably and of necessity crowned with triumph. The crucifixion of Jesus was regarded as a malicious invention of the Jews, who in reality crucified some other sufferer, while Jesus entered into the Divine glory. Muhammed had no appreciation of the doctrine of the Crucifixion.

In order to understand Muhammed's attitude towards Christianity, we must examine in greater detail his view of this religion and especially his conception of the distinction between its essential and its spurious elements. In the first place he must have regarded the Trinity as repugnant to reason: he considered the Christian Trinity as consisting of God the Father, Mary the Mother of God, and Jesus the Son of God. In the Qoran, God says, "Hast thou, Jesus, said to men 'Regard me and my mother as Gods by the side of God?'" Jesus replies, "I will say nothing but the truth. I have preached, Pray to God, who is my Lord and your Lord." (5. 116, f). It is possible that we have here a development of some Gnostic conception which regarded the Holy Ghost as of feminine gender. This fact is enough to prove that his theory of Christianity was formed by combining isolated scraps of information and that he cannot have had any direct instruction from a Christian knowing more than the outlines of his faith.

Muhammed also denied the divinity of Christ: This is an obvious result of the course of mental development which we have described and of his characteristically Semitic theory of the nature of God. To him, God is one, never begetting and never begotten. Denying the

divinity of Jesus, Muhammed naturally denied the redemption through the Cross and indeed the very fact of the crucifixion. Yet, strangely enough, he accepted the miraculous birth: nor did he hesitate to endow this purely human Jesus with all miraculous powers; these were a proof of his divine commission, and marvellous details of this nature aroused the interest of his hearers.

Mary, the sister of Ahron,—an obvious confusion with the Old Testament Miriam—had been dedicated to the service of God by her mother's vow, and lived in the temple under the guardianship of Zacharias, to whom an heir had been recently born in answer to his prayers, namely John, the forerunner of the Holy Ghost. The birth is announced to Mary and she brings forth Jesus under a palm-tree, near which is a running spring and by the dates of which she is fed. On her return home she is received with reproaches by her family but merely points in reply to the new-born babe, who suddenly speaks from his cradle, asserting that he is the prophet of God. Afterwards Jesus performs all kinds of miracles, forms birds out of clay and makes them fly, heals the blind and lepers, raises the dead, etc., and even brings down from heaven a table ready spread. The Jews will not believe him, but the youth follow him. He is not killed, but translated to God. Christians are not agreed upon the manner of his death and the Jews have invented the story of the Crucifixion.

The Muhammedan movement at its outset was influenced not by the real Christianity of the time but by a Christianity which Muhammed criticized in certain details and forced into harmony with his preconceived ideas. His imagination was profoundly impressed by the existence of Christianity as a revealed religion with a founder of its own. Certain features of Christianity and of Judaism, such as, prayer, purification, solemn festivals, scriptures, prophets, were regarded by him as essential to any religious community, solely because they belonged both to Judaism and to Christianity.

During the period of his life at Medina, Muhammed abandoned his original idea of preaching the doctrines of Moses and Jesus. This new development was the outcome of a struggle with Judaism following upon an unsuccessful attempt at compromise. In point of fact Judaism and Christianity were as widely different from one another as they were from his own teaching and he was inclined to regard Abraham as his own forerunner for he had preceded both Moses and

Jesus, and was revered by both religions as the man of God. He brought Abraham into connection with the ancient Meccan Kaba worship: the Kaba or die was a sacred stone edifice, in one corner of which the "black stone" had been built in; this stone was an object of reverence to the ancient Arabs, as it still is to the Muhammedans. Thus Islam gradually assumed the form of an Arab religion, ultimately developing universalist tendencies. Muhammed, being the last in the ranks of the prophets, must also be the greatest. He epitomised all prophecy and Islam superseded every revealed religion of earlier date.

Muhammed's original view that earlier religions had been founded by God's will and through divine revelation, led both him and his successors to make an important concession: adherents of other religions were not compelled to adopt Islam. They were allowed to observe their own faith unhindered, if they surrendered without fighting, and were even protected against their enemies, in return for which they had to pay tribute to their Muslim masters: this was levied as a kind of poll-tax. Thus we read in the Qoran (IX. 29) that "those who possess Scriptures," i.e., the Jews and Christians, who did not accept Islam were to be attacked until they paid the gizja or tribute. Thus the object of a religious war upon the Christians is not expressed by the cry "Death or Islam"; for such attacks were intended merely to extort an acknowledgment of Muhammedan supremacy, not to abolish freedom of religious observance.

Moreover, as we have seen, the Qoran itself regarded Christians as possessing divine wisdom, and some reference both to Christianity and to Judaism was necessary to explain the many otherwise unintelligible passages of the Qoran. Allusions were made to texts and statements in the Torah and the Gospels, and God was represented as constantly appealing to earlier revelations of Himself. Thus is was only natural that interpreters should study these scriptures and ask counsel of their possessors. Of primary importance was the fact that both Christians and Jews, and the former in particular, accepted Muhammedanism by thousands, and formed a new intellectual class of infinitely superior ability to that of the original Muslims, able to attract the best elements among the Arabs to their teaching. It was as impossible for these apostate Christians to abandon their old habits of thought as it was hopeless to expect any sudden change in the

economic conditions under which they lived. Christian theories of God and the world were accepted but naturally assumed a Muhammedan colouring and thus the great process of accommodating Christianity to Muhammedanism was achieved. The Christian contribution to this end was made partly directly and partly by teaching, and in the intellectual as well as in the economic sphere the ultimate ideal was inevitably dictated by the superior culture of Christianity. The Muhammedans were thus obliged to accept Christian theological views and the foundation of Christian and Muhammedan cultures thus became at many points substantially identical.

In dealing with common problems the final determination of the points at issue was by no means always identical, especially in cases where the Qoran definitely contradicted Christian views of morality or social laws. But in these cases also, Christian ideas were able to impose themselves upon Muhammedan tradition and to influence in practice, even when opposed by the actual text of the Qoran. They did not always pass unquestioned and even on trivial points often encountered resistance. The theory of Sunday was accepted, but not the day, Friday being preferred in its plan; meetings for worship were held in imitation of Christian services, but attempts to sanctify the day and to proclaim it a day of rest were forbidden. Except for the performance of divine service, Friday was an ordinary weekday. On the other hand when the Qoran was in agreement with Christianity, the Christian ideas of the age were literally accepted and exercised an influence on any further development of the question. This is clear, not only in points of detail but in the development of the general theory of man's place in the universe.

In details of outward form great divergency is apparent. Christianity possessed a clergy while Islam did not: yet the force of Christian influence produced a priestly class in Islam. It was a class acting not as mediator between God and man through sacraments and mysteries, but as moral leaders and legal experts: as such it was no less important than the scribes under Judaism. Unanimity among these scholars could produce decisions no less binding than those of the Christian clergy assembled in church councils. They were representatives of the congregation which "has no unanimity, for such would be an error." Islam naturally preferred to adopt unanimous conclusions in silence rather than to vote in assemblies. As a matter of fact a body of

orthodox opinion was developed by this means with no less success than in Christianity.

The attitude of Christianity toward marriage was not always encouraging, but Islam found in the Qoran the text "Ye that are unmarried shall marry" (24, 32). In the face of so clear a statement, the condemnation of marriage, which in any case was contrary to the whole spirit of the Qoran, could not be maintained. Thus the Muhammedan tradition contains numerous sayings in support of marriage. "A childless house contains no blessing"; "the breath of a son is as the breath of Paradise"; "when a man looks upon his wife (in love) and she upon him, God looks down in mercy upon them both." "Two prayers of a married man are more precious in the sight of God than seventy of a bachelor." With many similar variations upon the theme, Muhammed is said to have urged marriage upon his followers. On the other hand an almost equally numerous body of warnings against marriage exists, which were also attributed to Muhammed. I know no instance of direct prohibition, but serious admonitions are found which usually take the form of a denunciation of the female sex and were early interpreted as warnings against marriage by tradition. "Fear the world and women"; "women are the faggots of hell"; "but for women men might enter Paradise." Here we come upon a strain of thought especially Christian. Muhammed regarded the satisfaction of the sexual instincts as natural and right and made no attempt to put restraint upon it: Christian asceticism regarded this impulse as the greatest danger which could threaten the spiritual life of its adherents, and the sentences quoted above may be regarded as the expression of this view. It was natural that the social position of women suffered in consequence. The idea of woman as a creature of no account is certainly rooted in the ancient East, it reached Islam through Christianity, accompanied by Christian hostility to marriage.

In this way we see what an astonishing similarity is apparent even in the treatment of questions on which the divergence of opinion was fundamental. But this divergence is of secondary importance in comparison with the general affinity of the two theories of life, so that our estimates of Christian mediaevalism and Muhammedan mediaevalism must in many respects be the same. Both regard man as no more than a sojourner in this world. It is not worth while to arrange for a permanent habitation, and luxurious living is but pride. From

this standpoint the simplicity of private dwellings in mediaeval times both in the East and West is to be explained, for expensive architecture was confined to churches and mosques which were intended for the service of God. These Christian ideas are reflected in Muhammedan theory, as follows: "The worse use which a believer can make of his money is to build." "Every building, except a mosque, will stand to the discredit of its architect on the day of resurrection."

Upon similar principles we may explain the demand for the utmost simplicity and reserve in regard to the other enjoyments of life. To eat whenever one may wish is excess and two meals a day are more than enough. The portion set apart for one may also suffice for two. Ideas of this kind are of constant recurrence in the Muhammedan traditions: indispensable needs alone are to be satisfied, as indeed Thomas Aquinas teaches. Similar observations apply to dress: "He who walks in costly garments to be seen of men is not seen of the Lord." Gold and silver ornaments, and garments of purple and silk are forbidden by both religions. Princes ought to live as simply as beggars and posses only one garment, so that they are unable to appear in public when it is being washed; they must live upon a handful of dates and be careful to save paper and artificial light. Ideal descriptions of this manner of life are common in the oldest records of the first Caliphs, but should not be accepted as history. It is however, all the more important that after the lapse of one or two generations Muhammedan historians should describe their heroes as possessing only the typical garment of the Christian saint. This one fact speaks volumes.

Another idea common to both religions is that every action should be performed for God or with reference to God. Exhortations to keep death always in mind, to repent and to bewail past sins are frequent. When a mention of the last Judgment occurs in the readings of passages from the Bible or Qoran, the auditors should burst into tears. It is related how upon one occasion a man was praying upon the roof of his house and wept so bitterly over his sins, that the tears ran down the waterspout and flooded the rooms below. This hyperbolical statement in a typical legend shows the high value attributed to tears in the East. It is, however, equally a Christain characteristic and the gracious gift of tears was regarded by mediaeval Christianity as the

sign of a deeply religious nature. Gregory VII is said to have wept daily at the sacrifice of the Mass and similar accounts are given of other famous Christians.

Imitation of Christ and the attempt to reproduce his poverty and renunciation of property, was a part of the Christian ideal. Muhammed, however, was not poor and at the end of his life had become a prince and directly stated that property was a gift from God. In spite of this his successors praise poverty and their praises are the best evidence that they were influenced not only by the prophet himself but by Christianity.

It was only natural that the ecclesiasticism which dominated the whole of life, was bound to assert itself in state organization but a distrust of the state as a secular institution was common both to Christianity and Muhammedanism, though unknown in the ancient world. Christianity first struggled to secure recognition in the state and afterwards fought with the state for predominance. The Islamic church and state were at first identical, but spiritually minded leaders drew the distinction between religion and politics. The idea of a divine polity was elaborated down to the smallest details, but remained a theory which was never put into practice. Nevertheless the ideal contained enough latent power so that every Muhammedan usurper was careful to secure his investiture by the Caliph, even if force were necessary to attain his object.

A similar attitude was also assumed by both religions towards economic life. The reaction against the tendency to condemn secular life, though apparent in Christianity, is certainly stronger in Islam. Thomas Aquinas condemned trade as a disgraceful means of gain, because the exchange of wares does not necessitate labour or the satisfaction of necessary wants. Muhammedan tradition says, "The pious merchant is a pioneer on the road of God." "The first to enter Paradise is the honorable merchant." The solution given to the problem differs in each case, but in Christian practice, opposition was also obvious. In the condemnation of the taking of interest and of financial speculation, the two religions agreed. Islam, here as usual, reproduces this Christian idea in the form of a saying of Muhammed: "He who speculates in grain for forty days, grinds and bakes it and gives it to the poor, makes an offering unacceptable to God." "He who raises

prices to Muslims (by speculation) will be cast head downwards by God into the hottest fire of hell." Many similar traditions fulminate against all forms of usury.

All these similarities, which might be multiplied at will, are to be explained by the mere continuity of civic life, which in outward form became gradually Islamized. The specifically *religious* aspects of Islam, however, also bear the stamp of Christian influence. We have to think only of Islamic worship. It has been shown that the main religious service, which takes place on Friday and consists of readings from Scripture and a sermon, is a close imitation of the earlier part of the Christian Mass and the general intercessory prayer for the congregation and the emperor or caliph occupies the same place in the order of the liturgy.

The same exhibition of common elements and parallel developments which we have observed in political, social and devotional life is apparent also in dogmatic theology. Here, if anywhere, it might be supposed that the contrast between the two religions should be obvious, for the initial divergences were so pronounced that the adoption of Christian ideas would seem impossible. In those centuries, however, Christianity was chiefly concerned with dogmatic questions, many of the problems of which were taken over by Islam.

Muhammedan dogmatic theology is concerned with only three main questions, the problem of free-will, the being and attributes of God, and the eternal uncreated nature of God's word. The mere mention of these problems will recall the great dogmatic controversies of early Christianity, the influence of which on Muhammedan scholasticism is demonstrable.

The most remarkable transformation of Islam due to Christian influence is found in the theological interpretation of the prophet himself. Muhammed never pretended to be anything but a human being, but the veneration of his followers made him appear as a performer of miracles, in fact as the greatest miracle-worker of all. A legendary life of Muhammed was composed on the model of the Christian Gospels, the so-called Sirah, and once *Muhammed* had been lifted above the human sphere, the same thing happened to his disciples and other pious believers. So too in Islam the general human inclination toward hero-worship led to the erection of a whole Pantheon of Saints, with the rites, ceremonies, pilgrimages, and sepulchral

cults which are everywhere a part of the worship of saints and relics, springing from primeval superstition and local tradition and handed down from one religion to another.

To this remarkable adaptability in religion, Islam owes its missionary success even today, among the natives of Africa and Asia. Islam is now a missionary religion. It does not operate in quite the same way as Christianity, which sends out missionary expeditions to spread civilization as well as religion, but is spread as in Africa rather by accidental transmission, one might almost say by contagion. The natives, with their primitive instinct for imitation, copy the manner of Muhammedans passing through their districts, and use Muhammedan religious ceremonies as a new and more powerful spell or wizardry, in addition to their own tribal magic. They begin with amulets, then prescriptions for all sorts of magic tricks and incantations are taken over, and finally the whole elaborate business of Muhammedan magic, which, though coming from classical antiquity, has been thoroughly Islamized. In doing this, the natives have no idea of formally adopting the Islamic creed, but having gone so far, their attachment to Islam is usually assured.

It is interesting to note that, under European colonial rule, Muhammedanism is spreading more rapidly than before, although Christian missionaries are at work in all those colonial territories. What is the explanation of this strange fact? It is connected with the greater safety which European administration has created everywhere, making possible a livelier intercourse and exchange. Before the time of European domination Muhammedan tradesmen also entered pagan areas, but they came as slave-hunters, i.e., as enemies who wanted to gain their ends by force. Now, however, they are simply dealers. Possessing a higher civilization than their customers, yet not belonging to the unapproachable class of Europeans, they enjoy much authority among the natives.

A further advantage is afforded the Muhammedan missionaries by the increasing disintegration of the local tribal organization. The construction of roads and railways brings into existence a considerable floating population, which has adopted one or another of the leading Muhammedan languages used in trade and for this reason alone is apt to slip into Muhammedanism. These people also tend to be much impressed by certain sets of natives who are somewhat more

civilized than themselves and who, like the Arabs or Haussa, form a sort of supernational, i.e., Islamic upper class. The European colonial powers have made use of these more civilized groups and their friends as mediators, especially at the beginning of colonization and continue to do so even today. To be a Muhammedan has been regarded as a sign of refinement or rank. A negro could thereby acquire equal standing with the Muhammedan Arabs, while conversion to Christianity did not, by any means, make the native a European.

In other respects too, the difficulties which Christian missionary enterprise encounters in competition with Islam should not be underrated. In well established Islamic areas the problem of the Christian missionary is practically hopeless. The educated Muhammedan naturally looks upon the magic practices of the primitive Africans approximately as the enlightened European regards the superstitions of his own people, i.e., he will smile at them and make fun of them and only indulge in them himself occasionally in secret. The educated Muhammedan, however, knows the relations of his creed to Christianity, but regards them, not as a critical European, but as a critical Oriental. To his mind Christianity is not a convenient religion if for no other reason than that one does not know which of the Christian churches or denominations to join. Moreover he believes Islam to be a more advanced, a more highly developed religion than Christianity. He views Christianity in much the same way as we do Judaism. A Muhammedan is no more likely to become a Christian than a Christian is likely to be converted to Judaism. Certain Christian doctrines are unintelligible to him, as they were to Muhammed before him, for example the doctrines of the Trinity and the propitiatory value of suffering. Islam is much simpler, much more modern than Christianity and has anticipated the Monism of the age of natural sciences. But the thing in modern Christianity which, to the Islamic mind, seems most open to criticism is the fact that the teachings of the Christian churches and the behavior of European nations and individuals do not harmonize. Missionary work suffers greatly from the striking contrast between the teachings of the missionaries and the conduct of Europeans in the colonies.

The great problems of Europeanizing the Orient need not be considered in our present discussion because they are more of a cultural

nature and affect the question of religious competition only indirectly. But in Islam, as I have tried to show, religion pervades the whole of life, and so these conflicts do sometimes take on the character of a struggle between two religions. Inasmuch as all the European powers are Christian and, in the Orient, have concerned themselves more with the interests of the oppressed Christians than with those of the ruling Muhammedans, it was inevitable that the advance of European civilization in the Orient should be felt by Muhammedans as a form of Christian aggression. This feeling evolved a sense of solidarity among the Muhammedans, and from this arose the movement which is generally known now as Pan-Islamism. Its spirit is as old as Islam itself, but the conditions just described have given to it an added impetus which has made it appear as something new and surprising in the eyes of the Europeans.

If we consider only the religious aspects, the reaction of the Orient to the Oriental policy of Europe has been twofold. In the first place, it has been a repudiation of all European influences from religious motives and a corresponding reaffirmation of the truths of Islam, which has attempted to overcome a vague sense of Islamic inferiority by means of an exaggerated claim for the superiority of Islam over Christianity. The political expression of this was the propaganda started by the predecessor of the last Turkish sultan. He, in order to strengthen his dwindling political power, proclaimed himself the political and religious head of an imaginary universal congregation of Islam. But even in this unambiguously reactionary movement Islam was unable to keep free of Christian influence. The development during the nineteenth century shows clearly the effect of Occidental notions of the papacy, in contrast with the traditional institution of the caliphate. Just as the pope withdrew from the secular sphere to the spiritual, so an attempt was made to transform the caliph, originally a purely secular ruler, into a sort of Muhammedan pope, and this was ultimately adopted as one of the tenets of Islam.

The other form of reaction was an adaptation of Islam to European ideas. Some of the institutions sanctioned by Muhammedanism, such as polygamy and slavery, were felt to be incompatible with the spirit of the modern age and efforts were made to eliminate them from the Qoran by tricks of interpretation, or, merely to declare them obsolete, although they were distinct precepts of the Qoran. That was,

of course, possible only if—contrary to all tradition—permission was given to *interpret* the religious sources. According to Islamic orthodoxy, the "gates of interpretation of the sources" (Qoran and tradition) have been closed ever since the third century of the Islamic era and the official interpretations given by the theologians of that age are *binding* to *this day*. In an ardent controversy, Islamic Modernists demanded that the "gates of interpretation" be reopened, and the road cleared for modern criticism and they have succeeded in carrying their point in those circles which are open to modern thinking. *Theirs* was a particularly difficult struggle, for they had to wage war on two fronts: on the one hand against the reactionaries and on the other against the ultra-modernists, who wanted to discard religion altogether to replace the Islamic community by a national or Oriental association and to transfer the fight from the field of religion to that of international politics. Apart from missionary competition the contest between Christianity and Islam is an organic feature of the struggle between Asia and Europe.

RELIGIOUS VALUES OF CONTEMPORARY INDIAN NATIONALISM

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One method by which we may determine the quality and rank of a religion is to enquire as to its spiritual fruitfulness. In order that it may pass this test successfully it is necessary that it possess within itself a dynamic quality; it must be a source from which issues creative energy. But alongside of creativity there must be at the same time a power of control. It is not the tumult of the soul that the gods approve, but something that, accompanying its activity, may be described as its depth, an inward concentration and restraint that directs that activity towards an appointed goal. The necessity for this second element, if religious ends of the highest quality are to be attainable, could be demonstrated by reference to such a historic faith as that of Islam. Zeal and ardour this religion has achieved in abundance, but it fails to provide the "inner check" without which these energies are likely to be soon dissipated. Another example of a different kind that deserves study as exhibiting this kind of onesidedness is to be found in the influence exercised by the spirit of nationalism. This spirit and temper which are so widespread in the world at the present time may in some of their modern phases quite properly be described as a religion, and indeed as one of the religions that at the present time are replacing in their authority over men's lives the old historic faiths.

Nationalism is not, it is true, a new factor in human history, but it has extended its sway in recent years over large areas of the world and seems to be continually annexing new regions of influence. It has infected every department of our lives, so that we may suffer from economic nationalism, political nationalism, literary nationalism or religious nationalism, or, indeed, from all of these combined and other forms of the disease as well. As is apt to be the case with diseases as virulently infectious as this one is, in its diffusion it even lays hold

* A lecture delivered at Columbia University by Dr. Macnicol of Edinburgh, for many years a missionary of the Church of Scotland in India, and during 1932-1935 Wilde Lecturer in Natural and Comparative Religion in Oxford University.

of those who have no desire to be its victims, but who are compelled to succumb to it because it has extended its control so widely that escape from it is impossible. When the fever is at its maximum, such nationalism may assume, because of its intensity and the grasp it lays upon its victims, a quasi-religious character. Its votaries are to be found among all races, but their fervour finds most ardent expression at the present time in some of the lands of Europe and of Asia. India provides a typical example of the powerful influence that it exercises, and it is, accordingly, the consequences from Indian nationalism that we shall keep specially in view in this investigation.

Some may question the propriety of making use of the word religion to designate this attitude and influence. In our study, however, what we wish to direct our attention to is not so much what religion in its essence is as what issues from it. Viewed from that angle it can be suitably defined as that which unifies a man's life and governs his outlook upon the world about him. Whatever it is that does that for us is certainly accomplishing one of the central purposes of religion; it has adopted its prerogatives and is, in fact, discharging its characteristic functions. We can say without hesitation that in contemporary Germany and contemporary India in the case of very many—and these the most influential classes—nationalism more than any other single force is what governs their lives. In its scales life's values are weighed. It has become that which gives life its meaning and purpose and which strengthens the members of the nation to make sacrifices for it. Thus it comes about that for them the nation is clothed with the vesture of the Eternal, and, assuming a "numinous" quality, takes the place of a religion within their lives, and performs its office.

Before proceeding further it is advisable that we should make clearer to ourselves what we mean by the word nationalism. A nation cannot be defined by the elements that constitute it. Its members need not belong to a single race, or speak one common language, or all profess the same religion. Sometimes, it is true, these unifying elements may enter into nationalism and increase its coherence and strength. Thus Nazi Germany has been at pains to emphasise a real or imagined racial unity, and such a fanatical nationalist as Count Ludendorf is reported as declaring in a defence of German nationalist policy that "only that people can survive which declares its loyalty

to racial principles." There must in any case be some possession or quality common to the members of the nation that draws them together into one, some common heritage from the past and some common hope or purpose for the future. The most diverse elements may be, and often have been, wrought by some such centripetal force into a close-knit unity. For that reason we may say that the determining influence in creating a nation is an element that is psychological. In the words of a distinquished student of psychology, what we encounter here is "a spiritual being; its existence is a mental or a spiritual fact, though it requires certain physical or biological conditions."[1]

The characteristics of a nation which we are endeavouring to emphasise may be brought into clearer relief if we distinguish it from the state. By a state is generally meant a nation so organised that it rules itself and guides its national destiny. The elements that go to the making of the nation are more imponderable than those which are required for the ordering of the life of the state. India, indeed, admirably illustrates the distinction we are making. It is a country which does not yet quite fulfil the definition of a state, but many people would not hesitate to affirm that it is already a nation. It certainly possesses physical and biological conditions which help in their measure towards nation-hood,—a population that have lived together for many centuries, that share in the main the same traditions, and that are separated from the rest of the world by formidable barriers, the sea on one side and the tremendous boundary wall of the Himalayan mountains on the other. But among the characteristics that unify the inhabitants of this region the most important is their possession of certain spiritual attributes that, imponderable as they are, possess immense significance for the creation of a sense of national identity,—common memories and common aspirations which draw them instinctively together and mark them off decisively from other nations.

This, then, is nationalism, a temper and outlook in the members of a nation or potential nation impelling them, as the sense of their unity in the possession of common traditions and of a community of sentiment draws them together, to seek to express this unity in forms of government to which they are ready to submit themselves. The strength of this temper and outlook will be the measure of the coher-

[1] W. MacDougall, *The American Nation.*

ence of the members of the nation. Religious differences need not, as many examples prove, prevent such singleness of sentiment and purpose as is required if they are to be made and to remain truly one. In the case of India it has to be recognized that one serious danger to the unity of the nation lies in the fact of the deep cleavage that separates the Hindu and the Muslim. A question that the future alone can answer is whether identity in race and, in large measure, in culture and tradition will prove stronger as a force holding the people together than the importance that the Muslim attaches to his religion and his religious ambitions will prove as a force driving them apart into two hostile camps. It cannot be doubted that India will encounter here one of the most crucial tests of the power of nationalism over disruptive forces of another order. There are influences at the same time in the case of India that tend to strengthen and inflame nationalist ardour, and these have to be taken into account as well. Of these one that is specially significant arises from the fact that India is under foreign control and so unable to choose freely her own course. Such a sense of constraint tends inevitably to increase nationalist enthusiasm till it attains the intensity of passion. It should accordingly be of interest to us to examine some of both the good and the evil consequences that are issuing from the upsurgence of this spirit in the people of that land, especially if we consider these consequences in their effect upon religion and upon the influence and authority of religion.

In lands situated as India is at the present time any interest that is closely associated with the nation's life tends to become reckoned as sacred and this is seen to be so especially when it is touched by the sacrilegious hands of the foreigner. Thus a few years ago someone asked a Chinese student, "What is the most living religious question in China today?" The reply that was immediately given was, "The question of extra-territoriality." Such a cause as that in China or *swarāj* (self-rule or independence) in India, a cause, that is, with which the country's honour seems bound up, awakens intense emotion and makes men and women in these lands willing to sacrifice everything for it. The quasi-religious ardour so aroused may be more powerful in its control and may possess more ideal content in the circumstances of these lands than when the European in Africa appeals to the privileges of "the white man's religion." In the latter instance it

is a more personally selfish emotion that is aroused, but both are emotions of the same kind and quality. One may be better than the other, but neither issues a summons that is lofty or ennobling. Slogans such as "Rule Britannia," or—in India—"Bande Mataram" ("Hail to the Mother") may be quite harmless and useful means to express national enthusiasm and to draw the members of the nation together, but we know that often they become expressions of national arrogance and cupidity, and suggest and create jealousy and hostility towards other nations. It is just when these feelings obtain control of the national mind, possessing it like a frenzy, that they usurp the place of religion, becoming, indeed, an inverted religion that bears poisonous and evil fruits. The nationalism that we have been describing is the fine emotion of patriotic loyalty inflamed with evil passion, flown with insolence, rattling its sabre at any imagined insult to its honour or interference with its rights.

What we see in the case of the violent and uncontrolled nationalisms that have arisen in so many lands both of the east and of the west in recent years is that they take to themselves in their arrogance the authority that belongs to God only and claim the supreme lordship over men's lives; such a nationalism has been transformed in large measure into a religion. If this is the situation that we find in India it has arisen there in large measure because this evil seed has been sown in other lands, and India has seen in the world all around its harvest. Thus an Indian Christian was saying no more than the truth when he declared bitterly a few years ago that there were three great religions in India,—Hinduism, Muhammadanism and Europeanism. It is the fact that that is so that goes far to explain—if not to justify—the passionate outburst of the new political leader, Jawaharlal Nehru, who has during the last few years been drawing to himself the hearts of young India, when he cried, "Rebellion is my religion." We can understand and even sympathise with this mood, and we shall see in the facts that lie behind it how true is Dr. A. D. Lindsay's description of nationalism as "one of the most powerful religions of the world today," while at the same time it is, as he goes on to say, "a very depraved form of polytheism."

The evil consequences from nationalism, when it is elevated to such a position of divine authority, are open and manifest. They are apt to conceal from us the real benefits that the national spirit, properly

used, may well bring along with it. There is a danger lest we forget that, like the formation of the family, the formation of the larger aggregate of the nation is a natural and healthy consequence of the progress of the human race to higher levels of development. The family may form a selfish and predatory group, but that is not what it is meant to be or what it ought to be. So also with the nation. Its members form a unity which holds together for their comfort and defence those who constitute it, and which at the same time provides a training-ground for their service of the wider world of which they form a part.

An illustration of the need for such a narrow discipline if the wider lesson of world-brotherhood is to be rightly learned may be found in recent Indian experience. A generation ago the educated and enlightened leaders in Indian reform—men of vision and resolution like Mahadev Govind Ranade, the great pioneer in reform at that time—were eager internationalists with a far-reaching world-outlook. But during the last twenty years the vision that they had has faded, and this much narrower but more intense spirit has taken possession in its stead of the minds of those who occupy a similar position to theirs and exercise a similar influence. One of the most notable representatives of the earlier school of thought, Sir Ramkrishna Bhandarkar, was aware of this change that had come about, and expressed on one occasion the bewilderment it had produced in him. "Why is it," he asked, "that no-one now talks of internationalism as we used to do?" Perhaps the reason why the old internationalist ideal faded was that it had little reality in actual duty and experience accompanying it. Thus we are told that seldom, if ever, were any of the outcastes to be seen in the religious services of the Prarthana Samaj, the Theistic Church, which these high-caste leaders in reform attended and where the lofty ideals of internationalism were held up before them. The theory had not yet been put to any real test in practice. Today, however, the spirit of nationalism is binding together in a true fellowship the members, high and low alike, of the nation, and is awakening many of the higher-caste people, who have so long oppressed these despised outcastes, to a vivid sense of the wrong that they have perpetrated. "Their shame and ours," says Mr. Gandhi. It is the sense of kinship with them within the nation that has effected in his case, as in the case of many others besides him, this change of outlook and brought

about this awakening. "Yes, they are my brethren," many would say now in India, as Thomas Carlyle said in his day in England, "hence this rage and sorrow." The earlier internationalism was ineffective because it was not rooted in the sense of the nation's kinship. Only, it would seem, when that narrower brotherhood has been made real in the sharing of common tasks and purposes and hopes, can the rightful place be found for the wider loyalties that all men owe to one another as members together of the human family.

If we are to understand aright the passionate sentiment that nationalism has awakened in India and to form a true judgment in regard to it, we must realize in this way the good elements that are mixed in it as well as those that are evil. If it awakens men and women from mental lethargy and moral inertia, then it has so far advanced them to be wise. It is certainly true that the Hinduism that is so large a part of the heritage of the Indian people has the effect of opium, drugging their energies, teaching them that life is unreal and that the moral relationships that should be reckoned among its supreme possessions are only part of that illusion and, therefore, are unworthy of their effort. Their own best leaders are aware—apart altogether from political aims and ambitions—that, if India is to have any future, her children must somehow recover energy and purpose; they must, they realise, get more iron into their blood. They have been already seeking this through a revivified Hinduism, but with little prospect of any rapid achievement of success. But now from a wholly different quarter what they desire is being realised beyond all expectation. The new wind of nationalism has swept down upon them, filling their sails, and threatening to become a tempest. It has come "shaking the torpor from their creed," making them (to continue the quotation) "prepared to die, that is, alive, at last." In this respect Nationalism appears to be attaining for India at least one aim that is greatly needed and greatly desired. As a sin against national unity and national self-respect their treatment of the outcastes has been brought home to their bosoms through the quickening power of this new religion that not only is professed but actually moves and governs their emotions and their acts.

If nationalism accomplishes this aim in the case of the Hindu population, it will have gone far to justify the religious fervour which it has aroused. "The dream of Indian nationalism," one of the South

Indian leaders has declared "will be realised fully with the passing away of caste from our land." This particular leader, when he made that statement, had especially in mind a movement which was organised in that part of the country with a view to the recovery by the people of their self-respect. We have here a second consequence from nationalism which is significant. It bids men stand up upon their feet, giving them a common cause to serve, of which they can be justly proud. It helps to deliver them from what Dr. Rabindranath Tagore calls "the Śūdra spirit," that is, the spirit that cringes. Dr. Tagore traces this ignoble attitude to what he calls "the shibboleth of the Gīta"—a famous book which reveals the temper and attitude upon which the caste-system rests, appointing to each caste its proper station and duty, and discouraging any exploration of duty beyond that limit. The same South Indian rebels against tradition and against Brāhman domination have gone the length of expressing in a resolution their lack of confidence in Mr. Gandhi because of "his undermining of the sense of confidence and self-reliance in the people by his deliberate invocations of God in all his acts and utterances." They want, it is evident, beyond all else, a religion that will give them back their manhood, and that, they think, only the religion of nationalism can accomplish.

These are some of the excellent things that may be reckoned as products of the spirit of nationalism, but there are evils that more than balance the account. Like so many other things that we call good, these that have been named are good when used in the service of a good end, but, if not so used, may be far from good. They are good, too, in respect of what they affirm, but often evil in respect of what they deny or oppose. Energy is excellent, but to judge its quality we must know how it is going to be employed. We have still to discover the character of the ideal which it serves and by which it is guided and controlled. One obvious limitation to this ideal is, of course, that it is limited in its scope.

There is a narrowness in this religion that inevitably blinds its devotee to many precious things that are outside of the national limits within which he confines his good. This is so, for example, in regard to Gandhi's "religion of swadeshi." "Swadeshi," he says, "is that spirit within us which restricts us to the use and service of our immediate surroundings to the exclusion of the remote." Applied to

material things, we have here a principle of self-sacrifice to which must be accorded the highest praise. The simplicity of Mr. Gandhi's own life, brought down as near as may be to the level of the Indian peasant's, is an evidence of his deep sympathy with the poor and his desire to bear their burdens. But this rule cannot apply to spiritual gifts which are free for anyone to take and lacking which, our souls are impoverished. Applying his swadeshi rule Mr. Gandhi says, "In the matter of religion I must restrict myself to my ancestral faith." It is evident that in such a case nationalism may become a means by which the soul is starved and stunted. No one has any right to deny himself virtue or to deny himself truth. If even Mr. Gandhi yields to this jealous impulse, as though religious truth, or, indeed, any truth, was confined within national boundaries, and was one thing to one nation and another thing to another, then how much more is it likely to be the case that a nationalism that is held passionately by the ordinary man will make him blind and deaf to what is true and good for every man.

Nationalism, indeed, as is to be expected, goes much further in the case of many lesser men in India at the present time than it has gone in the case of one so fully controlled in his impulses by lofty aims as is Mahātma Gandhi; and in their case what is constantly happening is that their nationalism impels them to uphold that which is wrong and which they know to be wrong, for no higher reason than that it is part of their national tradition. Thus while it is true, as we have seen, that national feeling and the sense of a common brotherhood in the nation's life is proving a powerful motive for the breaking down of caste-barriers, at the same time if caste is attacked from without by a foreigner, the instinct of nationalism is up in arms at once to defend it, even while it is realised that it represents an evil and an unjust order. Similarly we frequently find men of high education and enlightenment joining in the primitive worship of a village idol, constrained to do so by their desire to have fellowship with their own people and to share with them the long tradition of their fathers' faith. This impulse that they yield to is not something to be viewed by us with a superior scorn, as though their civilization had been only a veneer and they had "gone native," as we describe it. It is representative of a profound and universal hunger, the upsurgence in the form of nationalism of our need for one another. The individual,

aware of himself as rootless and alone, must discover again and possess anew that fellowship without which our life is desolate.

There are many ways in which the desire of the members of the nation to stand together in the old paths and to share in the heritage of their long ancestry may, it is obvious, prove a hindrance in the way of reforms that are urgently needed. A single symptom of the manner in which this widespread malady betrays the influence of its infection in nationalist India may be mentioned. One of the chief evidences that Hinduism has carried along with it through the centuries a civilization of a high order has always been found in its emphasis upon what is called *ahiṁsā*, a doctrine that has often been interpreted in modern times as enjoining love, and that not only to one's fellowmen but to the lower animals as well. In consequence the Hindu religion has been in the main through many centuries deeply opposed to the sacrifice of animals. Mr. Gandhi is not by any means exceptional as a Hindu in the detestation that he expresses at the sight of the rivers of blood that flow at Kāli Ghat in Calcutta, though he feels the evil and the horror of it more deeply than most. Such a spectacle is altogether alien to the true spirit of Hinduism. And yet we are told that there has been in recent years a marked revival, even among the higher classes, of this practice of an older and a darker age. At Brāhman centres both in South India and in Western India, such sacrifices are reported as being once more publicly offered and on a large scale. "It is," one Hindu journal writes, "an irony of circumstance that when the caste Hindus were planning an orgy of animal sacrifice in Ellore, the Harijans of the same place" (that is, the outcastes who in the recent past have chiefly clung to this barbarous custom) "were reported to have resolved to give up animal sacrifices." The motives behind this return to barbarism on the part of the higher classes are mainly those that nationalism supplies—a return to the religion of the ancient days on the one hand and a desire, on the other hand, by the eating of meat, to restore virility to the nation in a day when might matters more than right. "We must," says one of their religious leaders, "strengthen Hindu muscles," and how otherwise, they think, than by abandoning a principle which, they would have claimed yesterday, was central to their religion?

But the most serious count of all against nationalism, when it attains in men's eyes the dimensions of a religion, is that it is a non-

moral power. It is amazing how much strength it reveals in those of whom it takes possession. We may have been inclined to despise them before as timid, flaccid, apathetic creatures, possessing no virility. But let this passion awake in them, and we see them throwing away their lives in reckless defiance, or dying inch by inch by hunger-strike, rather than yield to those whom they defy and hate. But we see this new strength at the service of a wholly unmoral deity. Neither Mother India nor any other national deity scrutinizes the moral quality of the offerings laid before her upon the altar. Murder is a consecrated rite when done in the service of those deities, and the assassin becomes a martyr in his country's sacred cause. The whole course of the national struggle in India throughout the past years has been perverting the moral instincts of the Indian people, Hindu, Muslim, Christian, making wrong seem right to them and falsehood truth. That is what so often happens in a struggle such as this which engages men's passions and fills their hearts with a devotion that is compounded both of love and hate. Young men and young women who are seeking, as youth should, for a cause that can fill their hearts are finding it here, and are doing battle with their fellows instead of doing battle, as they are meant to, with the dark powers of evil that encircle us all and are our common foes. They are saying, in the words of one of them, "We must learn to kill and to kill scientifically." Out of such a situation as that issue many tragic histories. Who can draw aside the cloak that hides the flame that in many youthful bosoms burns inwardly, turning so much ardour to ashes and to bitterness? No one can contemplate without a deep sense of its tragedy the waste of what is so precious and what was meant to be used for ends so different and so much more noble.

Thus to those in India who ask for bread of the spirit the nationalism of these harsh and cruel times offers a stone. Nor is this a consequence created by circumstance, but something that belongs to the essential nature of this religion. It can create the whirlwind, but it cannot command it. It often, indeed, by its violence dethrones a rival religion that might be worthier in its ideal, but is less deeply felt. In India many whom it has swept away no doubt persuade themselves that they are Hindus, as many who suffer from a like malady in other lands persuade themselves that they are Christians. But its effect in India, in the case of many, is to create in them an aversion to the

religion of their fathers and, in consequence, to all religion. "Personally," Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru declares, "I have no faith in, or use for, the ways of magic and religion," and an ever-increasing number from the new generation are following him along the path that leads to secularism and anti-religion. When they reach that goal, they find that nationalism, just because it inflames the spirit but neither cleanses it nor brings to it a higher guidance, is in full agreement with their new environment. No moral compunctions need hinder the methods of the "religion" of nationalism and no lofty aspirations or wide vistas draw it aside from its narrow and essentially selfish aims.

CHURCHES

By Percy Hughes
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Two years ago I was asked to address a convention of clergymen, and, being a philosopher by profession, decided that I should first find out what a church really is. The conclusion I reached seemed novel to me and, to the clergymen I addressed (they were kind enough to say) both novel and substantially correct. Since then, the quite serious plight of churches, both abroad where they suffer oppression, and here where their vitality is in question, suggests to me that a clearer vision of what a church's essential function is might help a little to further an early, peaceful and sound solution of this rather tragic issue.

It is clear that the function of fostering religion does not sufficiently distinguish a church, since there is now general recognition on the one hand, of what may be called *secular* religion,—a consecration of the spirit to ideal ends that, without benefit of clergy, ennobles many persons. On the other hand, we see rise *political* religions that engage the hearts of men so utterly that beside them church-fostered religions seem as a rule rather pallid affairs.

To unsympathetic eyes the distinguishing mark of churches is, I fear, that in fostering religion they in fact maintain their own authority by systematic falsification of cosmic and historic data. John Dewey's exposition[1] of this view is hard to refute and is endorsed by many thoughtful people. To answer that "religion is an art" not a philosophy, or that myth and symbol are quite proper instruments of religious observance, is inadequate unless it is previously shown what genuinely religious function there is that is hindered by such strict adherence in all details to facts as secular religion strives for. Indeed, what genuine religious need of man is there that churches may meet that may not better be met by secular schools?

This challenge, it seems to me, even the most candid churchmen I know answer in terms that becloud the issue. For, in one way or another they claim access to an ultimate "divine" source of insight and knowledge, *without clearly stating the basis and marking the limits*

[1] *A Common Faith*, 1934.

of that claim. With most churches it is the retention of writings and observances of Hebrew theocracy that especially misleads; for in that or in any theocracy spiritual insight is supposed to be competent to pass on matters of morals and government, of cosmic order and historic fact. With at least one church this theocratic flavor is rather of medieval heritage. In either case the basis of the churches' claim to special spiritual insight is so obscure that the *limits* of that claim seem simply to be what the public will "stand for."

In practically all modern states, by constitutional or legislative enactment, the churches stand stripped of every theocratic function. They are sanctioned as institutions that maintain a strictly autotelic, autonomous tradition of spiritual nurture. They now enjoy the status that Greek city-states allowed the "mysteries" that were linked with such names as Demeter, Dionysos and Apollo. For there these also flourished as autonomous religious institutions side by side with a political religion which schooled citizens in recognizing the dignity and worth, the unity and power of the state.

Obviously, just as did these mysteries, so the early Christian churches, duly segregating "things of God" from "things of Caesar," maintained autonomous spiritual traditions that centered in *observances* through which the initiate might experience a rapture (μαγία) a rebirth of the spirit, a new attitude in and toward a life of peace, communion and confidence. How these observances arose and evolved in the case of Christian churches we do in substance know. Jesus had seemed to those about him a man in some supreme sense "holy"; that is, his words and acts seemed to reveal one wholly fashioned in an attitude of mind, or spirit, that made him in direst circumstance master of life. So, partly by him and partly by his followers, observances were created with the purpose of so rendering those words and acts as to perpetuate in a way the presence of "the master," and carry the contagion of his spirit.

Of other autonomous traditions of spiritual nurture whose origins we know (Buddhism for example), exactly the same is true.

> Hence cometh all the need and fame of Teachers, men
> of inborn nobility, call'd Prophets of God,
> Saviours of society, Seers of the promised land,—
> that white-filleted company. . . .
> . . . . . .

the loved and loveable whose names live everymore,
the sainted pioneers of salvation, unto whom
all wisdom won and all man's future hope is due.

This early christian tradition of observance was in time enriched from many sources. The hymns and the "rhapsody" of Zion, the prayers and songs of the saints, paintings and sculpture and edifices inspired by Christian spirit, with ceremonials of repentance and rejoicing, were organized in what we know as "offices" or "services." Illuminating is the history of Christmas, which, before St. Francis (1223 A.D.), stressed the incarnation of God and the redemption of man. (Compare Milton's *Ode* on the nativity.) But Francis rather embodied in this festival his own attitude of love toward all living things, which harmonized so well with Jesus' spirit. Delighting in sheer motherhood and infancy he summoned the art of that day to convey that feeling. In later centuries to this new Christmas were added the starlit tree, the yule log, the mistletoe and the presents, each with its Christmas meaning, and all with a background of the christian music of joyously ringing bells. Inspired by this observance laymen such as Handel and Dickens have exalted it to transcend all churches.

In every autonomous tradition of spiritual nurture, whether in "mystery" or church, we find such a core of observance that is strictly maintained, "sacred," and calling for the utmost perfection in its rendering. (Ritual is merely the external relation between such observances.) Those who have responded duly in this sacred "service" take therefrom, it is presumed, a spirit of "piety," that pervades all their acts and associations. These then become themselves observances. With the devout the course of life is a sustained observance.

Summarizing, I suppose the essential, distinguishing function of a "church" to consist in maintaining and developing a tradition of observances through which may be transmitted the spirit, or attitude in and toward life, of men and women who have seemed in some special way in supreme degree masters of life. Such traditions usually embody above all the spirit of the founder, "the master," but evolve through harmonious organization of expressions, in any medium of art, of those who lived and worked in that spirit. The immediate effect of such observances in those who genuinely participate in them is a rebirth

[3] Robert Bridges, *The Testament of Beauty*, IV, 232 f.

of the spirit, a new attitude of communion and of confidence, that intensifies life and sheds radiance upon the world that is the field of its exercise. The competent cleric is essentially one who is skilled in rendering, extending and harmonizing such a tradition of observance, a task calling for special gifts, training and devotion. "Piety" is the carrying of the new and saving attitude into all affairs of life, so that the individual, each in his own way, makes all his acts observances. "Holiness" is the term that marks this ideal were it fully achieved. It sets a goal that is independent of any political aim, checking and supplementing political and secular religion, and wholly rejecting any theocratic claim.

This is what I mean by defining a church as an institution devoted to maintaining an autotelic, autonomous tradition of spiritual nurture.

Most peoples of the world have recognized or are willing to recognize churches as institutions devoted to the maintenance of such traditions. Churches are oppressed where they are suspected of political or theocratic leanings. They are retrograde and despised where, still clinging for authority to residues of theocratic tradition, they fail to recognize and meet the challenge to prove that in fact they have special access to fountains of spiritual life.

As a student of philosophy my business centers in merely *defining*, as I have tried to do, the issue, what part, if any, may churches play in modern societies? However, most definitions gain in clarity by noting what differences result therefrom in practical affairs.

In divesting christian tradition of theocratic traces, obviously we inhibit ecclessiastical dicta with regard to philosophic, political, scientific and historic material. For example, many of us have heard the well-known first chapter of Genesis so rendered that we felt the contagion of an attitude toward life that found nature meaningful and fertile in culminating moments,—in a word, dramatic. In such rendering the errors of old-time astronomers and geologists somehow intensify our sense of the spiritual vigor of the man who none the less thus harmonized his life with that of nature in its creative trend. Were the church to correct the account in terms of current science, it might seem to validate positions which doubtless in years to come will also be found defective. To suppose that the church must certify the data it employs in spiritual nurture is as absurd as to contend that Raphael wants us to believe that in heaven winds blow the robes of the Ma-

donna. To understand this is in one case as in the other the fruit of truly liberal education.

The amendment of observances and their enrichment is a theme for specialists in any given autotelic, autonomous tradition of spiritual nurture. Yet I may be permitted to note that the current observance of Jesus tarrying behind in the temple perpetuates a theocratic, medieval distortion which flatly contradicts the earlier tradition (Luke, II, 46) of Jesus "hearing the doctors and asking questions" of *them*. Stripped of its theocratic justification the current picture of graybeards lectured to by a boy savors of the grotesque; more than that, it hinders the growth of an observance that might well illuminate the relationship of church to school and of genius to learning.

The need for a church in the sense defined may be claimed on many grounds. In the first place, segregation is the rule in effective education. While a man may get much of the theory of farming by practical farming he does well to find time to spend days, weeks, months or years at an agricultural school. In our daily tasks we may cultivate the esthetic, but we need contact with those who live in art. Similarly, it may well be that for the utmost elevation and intensity of spirit most men should join in observances that are wholly given to lifting up our hearts and renewing a right spirit within us. In this argument there is, of course, no thought of limiting such institutions and observances to churches bearing the christian name.

In fact, the argument seems to point away from any unity of spiritual tradition or "common faith." Mr. Dewey defines "being religious" as "pursuing ideal ends with conviction of their general and enduring value against obstacles and in spite of personal loss" (p. 27), and without supposing that these ends exist prior to our thought of them (p. 85). This seems to make Plato and Robert Bridges destitute of religious experience, and takes no account of people whose attitude in and towards life makes much of thanksgiving, praise and love and somewhat less of "personal loss." That there should be some whole-heartedness and consecration to ideal ends in religious life all of us will concede; but this admits of such variety of religious experience that churches and faiths may well be many.

In fact, what is or should be common in faith and attitude concerns especially *political* and secular religions. The need for political religions is evident; they need not be warlike or chauvinistic. There is

need too for *secular* religion, an attitude of consecration to ideal ends that emerges from our commercial, scientific, esthetic and moral endeavors. But the claim seems plausible that the political and secular religions that prevail at a given time and place need both check and supplementation by institutions that devote themselves to perpetuating the spirit and attitude of great teachers, masters of life, "the loved and loveable whose names live evermore."

The centering of church tradition in observances that arouse a certain spirit or attitude in and toward life may seem to "emotionalize" religion. Of course, this is not the case if by emotion we mean, as many do, a chaotic and perturbed condition. Religion centers in feeling, in liking or accepting,—in disliking or rejecting. But it is a question of centering, not of exclusion. The mathematician observes, feels and wills even while his inquiry *centers* in isolating premises and tracing their implications. The fisherman feels, reflects, imagines and wills even while his activity *centers* in seeing what his intended victim does. The artist's imaginative process is the *center* of a vigorous intellectual, perceptual and emotional activity. The framing and rendering of observances calls for very special gifts, endowment, training and devotion; but its exercise surely is favored by mastery of materials derived from any and every phase of life.

I am not advocating churches but defining them, with the hope that "churchmen" of all faiths may thereby more clearly see their work in its essentials and avoid such anachronistic procedures and claims as have provoked and justified Dr. Dewey's widely read critique. At the same time I hope that this definition may assist those who, like Dr. Dewey, are primarily concerned with political and secular religion to observe, with understanding and appreciation, what churches actually are doing for people, or, if you please, to them.

COMMUNICATIONS

REPORT OF THE PHILOSOPHICAL DISCUSSIONS IN THE NATIONAL COUNCIL ON RELIGION IN HIGHER EDUCATION, SEPTEMBER 1936

By Kenneth W. Morgan
Associate Director of the Council

The National Council on Religion in Higher Education, founded in 1923 by the late Charles Foster Kent, is a fellowship of men and women who believe that religion should have greater influence in education. It seeks to accomplish this by serving as consultant in planning the religious program in colleges and universities, by helping to place in all fields of instruction well-trained men and women who have a positive religious interest, and by granting fellowships to a few carefully selected young men and women who intend to become college teachers.

There are over one hundred twenty-five Jewish, Catholic and Protestant Fellows serving in seventy-five of the leading colleges in America, with some thirty more serving in churches, synagogues, and social organizations, and a few in graduate study. Each year the Fellows gather at the Colgate-Rochester Divinity School at Rochester, New York, for a week of study and discussion of problems in mental hygiene, social ethics, education, philosophy, and the history of religion. The more philosophical discussions of the group this year were concerned with "Mediaeval Tendencies in Religion Today," and "The Philosophy of History."

One section chose to discuss mediaeval tendencies, following up the previous year's discussions of the relation between church and state. The question as to whether or not religion in America would resist political encroachments such as are common in Europe prepared the way for an evaluation of present religious tendencies.

The discussions began around the ideas provoked by Becker's "Heavenly City" and Berdiaeff's "End of Our World." Becker's heroic acceptance of his "brute" facts evoked an indulgent willingness to let him create his own rationalistic scheme of history, but found little support.

Professor Maynard Cassady led the discussion of Berdiaeff and Christopher Dawson. Berdiaeff sees an age arriving that is analogous in many ways to the Middle Ages. Together with Dawson he sees the present age as the end of an era for it has lost its spiritual foundation. Both men scorn democracy. Berdiaeff seeks a religious communism while Dawson prefers fascism. The discussion tended to accept their analysis of the situation, but to question their prophecies and solutions.

Professor Reinhold Niebuhr, a consultant, agreed that in one respect religion is the basis of a culture, but it should also be the source of judgment upon a civilization, as in the case of Hebrew prophecy. Contemporary Protestantism has become secularized, has identified religion and democracy and accepted bourgeois ethics as Christian. The hope lies in an awakening of prophetic religion which sees current problems in the light of history. Prophetic religion sees that communism is not good, but is an instrument of God against a situation which is anti-God, for religion in our time has allowed a situation which cried out for correction.

The contemporary spiritual dissatisfaction is evident in all of Europe at the present time; in American Protestantism it is reflected in the new Gothic architecture, the liturgical experiments, Buchmanism, the High Church tendency, and a widespread desire for that organic stability which is rightly or wrongly attributed to the Middle Ages. Professor Amos Wilder pointed out that the spiritual dilemma of the modern poets and artists of today often illuminates for us the religious need and quest of our times. In some cases also we have examples among them of a solution in terms of a return to Catholic Christianity, though a solution in pantheistic terms is more characteristic. The theme of the new poets is that of struggle rather than of victory.

Through this confusion has run a considerable interest in things mediaeval. Doctor Lynn White pointed out that nineteenth century romanticism found inspiration in the re-discovery of mediaeval literature and art. He felt that it is significant that our muddled clerics are turning increasingly for inspiration to the Middle Ages, which thought and felt more deeply about religion than has any other period in our history. Mr. Duncan Emrich discussed the awakening in Islam which shows itself in a renewed interest in the mysticism of Al-Ghazali and the scholasticism of Ibn Arabi.

Father Anselm Strittmatter, a consultant, in discussing recent trends

in the Roman Catholic Church, pointed out that the position of Roman Catholicism was defined by Pope Leo XIII in 1879. Modernism was condemned and scholasticism was given a new impetus which has continued to the present time; Thomism is once more openly opposed to Cartesianism. The nineteenth century was also noted for the widespread revival of monastic orders, most of them engaged in mission work, teaching and social service. The most important recent development in Catholicism is the Eucharistic revival which stimulates devotion and gives greater prominence to the doctrine of the Mystic Body of Christ. If mysticism and the Thomistic scholasticism are called mediaeval, then the mediaeval tendencies are very strong in Catholicism today.

An interesting movement in Catholicism known as "Liturgical Sociology" was reported by Doctor Teresina Rowell. It is a movement which bases social action on the Church's life of worship, which finds in the inner life of the Church both goal and ground for social change. The liturgy (writes Martin Schirber) "will be a powerful force in healing the rupture in the social body caused by the social heresy of individualism" for it teaches that men are not separate atoms but members of a Body and hence organically related to each other. The liturgy expresses the essential common bond uniting men, for it is based on the doctrine of the Church as the Mystical Body of Christ, each member of which is necessary to every other member as the hand is to the foot. Father Virgil develops vigorously the radical claim that the wealth of the world is either God-given or socially produced and really belongs to all, the community must see to it that each member has the necessities not only for physical existence and security, but for education and wider life.

Having discussed the present tendencies in religion the interest centered in the problem: What is a tenable position for the religious man in this time of confusion? Some can embrace Catholicism, some find communism satisfactory, but many do not feel completely at home with either. There was a feeling that the desire for worship is not adequately cared for in Protestantism, and that the critical faculty of the churches has been dulled. For the religious person the problem in its broadest aspect is that of the relation of the individual and authority. The group decided to continue its discussions next year with a direct attack on that problem.

A second section spent the week discussing the philosophy of history. Professor Horace L. Friess of Columbia, a consultant, began the discussion by giving his views on the issues brought to light by the history of the philosophy of history in west-European culture. The ultimate contours of the philosophies of history have not been set by individuals, but by the more general orientations of human life in institutions, morals, myths and ideals. The ancient Church had a double orientation toward a transmundane order of eternal beatitude and toward apocalyptic expectations of the future. The modern Enlightenment found the positive significance of history in the study of man's progressive achievement of civilization. The nineteenth century showed a new interest in exploring culture as a dynamic principle rather than merely as a deposit, but it may be questioned whether a new orientation of life arose at that time such as had formed the earlier theories.

The historical monism derived from theology has corrupted our ideas of historical science just as much as the pluralism represented by Spengler's self-contained cultures. For history is not one unfolding world-entity, but partial, overlapping and interacting histories of individuals and groups. A system of living more concerned for the interplay and mutual furtherance of individuals and groups could achieve a new orientation of life able to do more justice to the diverse meanings being discovered through expanded knowledge of history than prevailing orientations surviving from the past.

The discussion of Professor Friess's remarks centered around the question of the relation of historical meaning to the historical process.

Professor Reinhold Niebuhr suggested that the real problem of the philosophy of history is to recognize the dynamic of history while conserving the truth that history is not meaningful except as it is interpreted in dimensions that transcend history. The Hellenic conception of history is dualistic and negative, the Hebraic is a transcendental monism with a real appreciation of history. The Hegelian philosophy of history is an artful combination of the Hellenic and the Hebraic, with the dynamic supplied by the Hebraic. Thomistic thought, based on the premise that the City of God has conquered the City of the World, reinstates a static conception of history that is essentially Aristotelian. Orthodox Protestantism tends towards Neo-Platonism in its basic conception of history, with the positive element confined to the

individual life. Marxism is a secularized version of Hebraic prophecy, viewing history as a process of judgment on evil, having a chosen class instead of a chosen people, and picturing the proletariat as a saving remnant.

The Marxian philosophy of history was discussed by Professor Walter Muelder. Marx carefully employed and improved the method of Hegel in working out the theory of historical materialism, and accepted from him the conception of freedom as the mastery of ourselves and external nature through knowledge, the concept of labor as the process by which man externalizes himself, and agreed to the decisive importance of consciousness. For Marx, things exist independently of consciousness, and knowledge is dialectically built up. The clue to the understanding of the state and society is in the analysis of the relations involved in production. While Hegel considered the state as the locus of man's highest ethical obligations, Marx viewed it as the instrument of the ruling class in the class struggle. The dialectical resolution of the class struggle will bring the classless society, but that resolution is only hypothetically inevitable.

Some of the Group disagreed that the Hegelian dialectic is central to Marx, holding that it is incidental to his analysis of particular social conditions, and only occasionally applicable to history. There was a general feeling that Marx deals inadequately with the problem of human responsibility.

Some aspects of the Christian philosophy of history were presented by Dr. Paul Schilling. The center of the Christian view is its theistic metaphysics with God active in history. There is direction and purpose in history: the Kingdom of God is the goal. The ultimate outcome of history is in God's control even though the course of advance seems circuitous. God acts in history as the judge and destroyer of evil and as the redeemer and creator of good. God did not create violence, injustice, suffering and sin, but is often able to utilize them in the achievement of His purposes.

The idea of progress in history was constantly coming into the discussions. Professor Niebuhr felt that it confuses the issue by failing to distinguish between biology and history, carrying over without qualification into the idea of moral progress the concept of development. But the development of reason does not mean the development of justice. Miss Kathryn Rogers pointed out that the discussions of progress in

history vary according to the criterion of judgment selected, the time span within which it is applied, and the area which is analyzed. Most such discussions are limited to western civilization and recorded history; the criterion is usually survival value. The doctrine of progress is criticised on three grounds: adequate generalizations concerning the evolutionary process cannot be made; belief in the progressive nature of history is *a priori*, not derived from analysis; the doctrine is ethically demoralizing because productive of a *laissez faire* attitude toward evil. Such criticism leaves four possibilities open to contemporary philosophy of history: to abandon the idea of progress; to shift the emphasis from the inevitability to the possibility of progress; to seek a new pluralistic interpretation of history with an acceptable metaphysic which will integrate men in their efforts to achieve progress; to relate the hope of progress to some "unconditioned" aspect of existence. Miss Rogers felt that a new metaphysic of history is required. The general discussion centered around the means of determining the validity of any criterion of progress.

The concluding discussion, concerning the influence of ideas on history, was led by Professor Howard Howson. Since recorded history is the interpretation of the past in the light of our understanding of the present, it is necessary to consider first how our concepts of the present have been developed. Concepts are not mere abstractions from impressions, but carry overtones of meaning influenced by past experience, imitation, suggestion, and numerous factors which limit their spontaneity. Ideas can be deliberately controlled, but tend to become stereotyped centers of emotion. Not merely historiography, but history itself is affected by our conception of history since our philosophy of history forms the basis of our philosophy of action. The Hebrew conception of history is a case in point. History is modified by a people's conception of themselves. Ideas act as barriers between actualities and people; the cultural lag in ideas due to lack of realism is the real opiate of the people.

In connection with the discussion of the influence of religious ideas on history, Professor Howson was asked to give his concept of religion. On the cosmological side, religion is the courageous and sustained effort to adapt to the widest environment one knows, including the supernatural if that category is demanded by one's thinking. On the side of worship, it is the experience of the holy with the demands such

experience makes on conduct. On the social side, it is the conservation of social values, or social salvation. And on the personal side it is the conservation of personal values, or personal salvation.

NOTES ON INTERNATIONAL CHURCH ACTIVITIES*

Preparations are well under way for a series of impressive world-congresses inspired by the hope for growing peace and co-operation among Christians.

Under the chairmanship of the Archbishop of York the Continuation Committee appointed at Lausanne in 1927 is making definite plans for the Second World Conference on Faith and Order to be held at Edinburgh during the summer of 1937. "During the ten years since 1927 the Continuation Committee has become increasingly aware of the change in the world situation, and the program for Edinburgh has been drawn up so as to ensure its discussions being carried on in close touch with the problems of today." Three of the topics for discussion on which special commissions have been working are: The Church of Christ and the Word of God, The Ministry and the Sacraments, and The Church's Unity in Life and Worship.

Meanwhile the leaders of the Universal Christian Council for Life and Work are planning their program for the World Conference to be held at Oxford in 1937 to continue the work begun at the Stockholm Conference of 1925. The Conference will be devoted to the discussion of "Church, Community, and State." Six aspects of this topic have been outlined for particular examination: "The Church and the Community," in which consideration will be given to folk movements, and to those spheres which are not "church," e.g., culture, politics, economics; "The Church and the State," in which will be included the treatment of the claims of the modern State and of the Christian conception of freedom; "Church, Community and State in Relation to Economic Problems," in which in particular the communist conception of the economic order will be examined; "Church, Community, and State in Relation to Education"; "The Universal Church and a World of Nations," in which will be handled the question of nationalism, the international problem, and the Church as an œcumenical society. Spe-

* The substance of these notes is gleaned from the bulletins of the International Christian Press and Information Service of Geneva, to which the reader is referred for further information.

cial attention will be given, moreover to "Christianity and War."

There is to be a World Conference of Christian Youth in 1939 "somewhere in Europe" sometime between July 20 and August 10. Mr. R. H. E. Espy, the Secretary of the Œcumenical Youth Commission is in charge of the preparations. The Congress is being sponsored by The World's Student Christian Federation, The World Alliance of Y.M.C.A.'s, The World's Y.W.C.A.'s, and other international Christian youth organizations.

At a recent meeting of the Management Committee of the World Alliance for International Friendship through the Churches, held at Chamby sur Montreux, its President, Bishop Ammundsen of Denmark, spoke as follows: "We are now beginning to realize in what degree our social conditions imply a denial of the sovereignty of God; with all our might we will now try to permeate them with the principles of Christ; especially we will do away with war through the establishment of an international order through disarmament, negotiation, arbitration and through an organ above the individual States. Only here is the salvation of the world to be found. The hope that men had put in the League of Nations seems to have been an illusion; and the world is living in dread of another catastrophe, probably unparalleled in horror. . . . Generally it must be said that statesmen did not realize that the idea of the League of Nations could not simply be annexed to the remnants of the old political system which was responsible for the Great War, but required a totally new conception of the relation of the States to one another and to the central organ above them. The world, in creating the League, embarked upon a grand new experiment, but in so hesitating and half-hearted a way that the new order was not equal to the old bad forces. The Covenant is too anxious to point out that the League is not a Super-State, and to safeguard the independence of the individual States. . . . The failure to achieve general disarmament was the most significant proof that the new spirit had not sufficiently got hold of the nations. . . . The question is to know whether or not there exists something which is above the nations. If there is in us a reality which goes beyond all nations, colours, languages, races, then we are bound and compelled to realize it as far as it is possible to move men. That is the only problem of the League, forcing us to get out of our spectator-mentality."

In the course of an address before the Roman Catholic Evidence

Guild of America, the Rev. Dr. Charles A. Hart urged Roman Catholics to sponsor interdenominational meetings to discuss the problem of unity among Christians. He held interdenominational antagonisms to be "a source of serious scandal to the world," and a cause of the religious indifference of our times.

During the last year the Modern Missions Movement was transformed into the Movement for World Christianity. In its new constitution we read of "a conception of missions which faithfully represents Jesus and his Gospel; which, recognizing every aspect of human need, lays a demand upon the Church to meet those needs in the light of new world conditions and changing forms of thought; and which makes for increased co-operation among religious and social groups, free from ecclesiastical and doctrinal divisiveness and from all sense of national and racial superiority." The Constitution states the Church's obligation to christianize economic, political and cultural spheres, and to "appreciate the spiritual goods and high aspirations of non-Christian peoples, which are also the basis upon which Christianity may hope to fulfil its mission of helping to bring men and society everywhere the abundant life of the Kingdom of God."

Reflecting the general trend toward the nationalization of missionary churches, the Bishop of Zululand is reported to have said recently: "They had to develop the church which was erotic into a national church." And the reporter adds: "Native bishops are teaching the Catholic faith to their own people from their own angle, in their own way."

THE SRI RAMAKRISHNA CENTENARY

On the twenty-fourth of February, 1936, at the Ramakrishna Math in Belur, India, there was inaugurated a year of celebration in honor of the birth of the master. During the opening week thousands of devotees gathered from all parts of India at the Math to perform their *puja* in the temple and take part in the sacred *homa* ceremony. Six *brahmacharins* received formal initiation into *sannyasa,* and nine candidates were accepted into the Order as *brahmacharya.* In the evening a special radio program consisting of a drama depicting the life and teachings of Ramakrishna was broadcast all over the world. During the week pilgrimages were made to the scenes of his life, Dakshineswar, and the Cossipore Gardens. There were also public meetings, lectures, dramatic and musical performances. On the last day of the

celebrations some 30,000 people took *prasad* squatting on the ground, and in the evening a brilliant exhibition of fireworks ended the festivities.

The week was also celebrated in many other cities of India. At Benares "an imposing procession consisting of six elephants and more than a hundred motor cars" followed by a vast concourse of people accompanied a portrait of the Saint of Dakshineswar through the streets. A new Temple of Sri Ramakrishna was formally opened by Srimat Swami Vijnananandaji. At Calcutta a great public meeting was held in the Town Hall at which many notable Indian scholars spoke. A number of Conventions of Religion were held at which all the principal religions of the East were represented. All the speakers paid tribute to Ramakrishna as the prophet of freedom of conscience, harmony of faiths, religious toleration and inter-racial amity.

Among the celebrations in foreign countries an especially notable meeting was that of March 8 in the Town Hall of New York where the speakers included scholars of various races and creeds. In Providence a series of lectures on various types and aspects of mysticism was held as part of the Centenary celebration. In London the celebration included addresses by Sir Francis Younghusband and Mrs. Rhys Davids. In Paris two conferences were held, one at the Sorbonne and the other at the Musée Guimet, under the direction of M. Masson-Oursel, professor at the Institute of Indian Civilization. There were also celebrations held in Germany, Czechoslovakia, the Straits Settlements, and Africa.

In connection with the Centenary a brief biography entitled *Ramakrishna: The Man and the Power*, by Swami Gnaneswarananea, has been published by the Vedanta Society of Chicago. Perhaps no religious leader of modern times is more difficult for the Western mind to accept than this illiterate priest of Kali who has so profoundly influenced the religious life of India. And yet such scholars as Max Müller, Romain Rolland, and Rudolf Otto have found this eccentric mystic well worth a careful study. The psychological question arises whether a man of his type becomes a great mystic *because of*, or *in spite of*, his obviously psychopathic constitution, for all mystics are not psychopathic, and certainly all psychopaths are not mystics. It is superficially quite easy to psychoanalyze Ramakrishna, to find the "mother complex," the latent bi-sexuality, et cetera, but none of these abnormalities explain

the tremendous power he exerted over the lives of men. The explanation of hypnotism is also too simple to be taken seriously. Even the sophisticated members of the Brahma Samaj, with their Western education and contempt for the low forms of "idol worship" in which Ramakrishna indulged, found something in him which commanded their respect and allegiance. What that "something" was none of his biographers make clear. Swami Gnaneswarananda's little book, with its copious illustrations, celebrate this life, and exhibits something of its hold on Hindu piety, but leaves the central mystery still unsolved.

The Tressé Iron-Age Megalithic Monument, its Sculptured Breasts and their Relation to the Mother-Goddess Cosmic Cult. By V. C. C. Collum. Oxford University Press, 1935. Pp. xiv + 170, with 35 plates, 14 figures. 10/6.

The author gives a detailed account of her excavation and restoration of a Gallo-Roman *allée couverte* in the commune of Tressé (arrondissement of St. Malo, Ille-et-Vilaine) (pp. 1-59) and of the pottery, flint and chert implements, metal objects and beads, bones, and charcoal there discovered (pp. 59-89), this archaeological material being followed (pp. 91-161) by a lengthy discussion of the 'sculptured stones and their significance as symbols of a wide-spread cosmic cult.' With the purely archaeological section we are scarcely concerned in the present connection, though the author's statement (pp. 38-39) that charcoal was apparently packed about a buried (not cremated) corpse to preserve it from damp is of much interest. The striking feature about this *allée* is the presence of two stones, each sculptured with four breasts in relief, those on a transverse stone virginal in type, and those on a western, adult (p. 91); and in the author's opinion (pp. 156-157) it is not impossible that there may have been similar reliefs on a third stone (now broken). It is about these stones that the special problem of this *allée* centers. Miss Collum seem to consider the sculptures, the burial within the *allée,* and all the shards, etc., found there to be contemporaneous with the building of the *allée* itself; and she dates the structure by a bronze *as* of Domitian (81-96 A.D.). Of all this one can scarcely be so sure. The burial, notably, is hardly where one would expect to find it had the *allée* been built especially for it—it should then be at the further end (cf. figure 4); and despite Miss Collum's conviction that the *allée* had not been violated (p. 25), the possibility that the burial was long subsequent to the building of the structure might well be considered. The sculptures themselves, to judge from the photographs (especially Plate XXI), suggest that they may be of quite different date from the remainder of the construction, whether brought from some other building (as seems to have been the case with the sculptured stones in the

tumulus of Newgrange) or carved *in situ* long after the *allée* itself had been completed.

These scultpures have unhappily led Miss Collum into long divagations as to their origin and significance which one can, for her sake, only regret. One had hoped that the time was past when the Indian *Tantras* and the Jewish *Zohar* would be cited as authorities for a remote antiquity; and when the four breasts at Tressé are compared to the four teats of the Egyptian cow (cows normally have that number!) (pp. 93, 107), it is a bit difficult to take the author seriously. Before commenting on the 'arbitrarily formed *ogham* letters,' in which 'there survived a symbolism of Letters, if not of *gematria* on the Kabbalistic model' (p. 97), the author might have considered with profit the study of H. Arntz on 'Das Ogam' in Paul-Braune's *Beiträge zur Geschichte der deutschen Sprache* lix (1935), 321-413. She also ventures into the realm of etymology—one highly perilous for the amateur—thinking that Kālī 'the black female' is a feminine of Kāla 'time' (p. 98), and that Irish Ana is connected with Hebrew Ḥannāh (p. 118). Even in affairs Breton she is not infallible. She regards the Breton place-name Loperhet (Locus Brigittae) as suggesting 'that the locality was associated with Brigit before the influx of the Bretons from Britain' (p. 130), whereas, in face, Breton place-names in Loc- are all late, and 'le culte de sainte Brigitte en Bretagne n'offre aucune apparence de haute antiquité' (R. Largillière, *Les Saints et l'organisation chrétienne primitive dans l'Armorique bretonne,* Rennes, 1925, p. 25, note 31; cf. p. 142, note 20), the only old dedication being that of Perguet (near Bénodet, Finistère ; ib. p. 140, note 18). It would be unkind to comment further on this section. Suffice it to say that the author has been led seriously astray by chance and superficial resemblances, an error to which the amateur in comparative religion is particularly prone.

The riddle of the sculptures remains unsolved. One would think of the Gaulish 'Matres,' except that they usually appear as triads, not as dyads. One might suggest that they were apotropaeic in intention, for tabus against looking on the unclad human form are not so very uncommon. Or one may have here a Gaulish equivalent of the Irish 'sheela-na-gigs'—'representations of females, usually nude, with crossed legs, and with a certain emphasis laid upon the sexual parts. . . . They have all the appearance of representing some goddess of

fertility, who would naturally be associated with good luck' (R. A. S. Macalister, *The Archaelogy of Ireland*, London [1928], p. 348), a Breton parallel being the well-known 'Venus of Quinipily' (Morbihan). On the whole, the evidence thus far accessible would seem to suggest that we have here a multiplied (i.e., intensified?) representation of the earth-goddess in her double aspect of maid and matron; and the earth-goddess is not only she from whom all men come, but also she to whom all return at death (cf. J. A. MacCulloch, *Religion of the Ancient Celts*, Edinburgh, 1911, pp. 37, 42, 44, 67-68, 109-110; *Celtic Mythology* [=*Mythology of All Races*, III, i] Boston, 1918, pp. 98, 169, 345). In any event, sound method demands that the solution be sought, here as elsewhere, in the native area (except where the hypothesis of borrowing is supported by stern necessity or proved intercourse) rather than by laboured arguments from forced and—too often—superficial analogies from remote regions.

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Manus Religion: An Ethnological Study of the Manus Natives of the Admiralty Islands. By R. F. Fortune. Philadelphia: The American Philosophical Society, 1935. Pp. ix + 391. $3.00.

The study of primitive religions has been greatly advanced by this first rate account of the religious practices and beliefs of a coastal village of the Admiralty Islands, about 150 miles to the north of the New Guinea mainland. The book is noteworthy on several accounts. It describes a people whose lives are dominated by their religious sanctions—which is not universal for primitive people—and whose religious practices had not been influenced by Christian missions or White contact at the time of the study. Of even greater importance is the intimate knowledge of the people out of which the book is written. Dr. Fortune spoke and understood the Manus language, and describes each situation in its bearing upon the life history and the obligations of each individual. The account goes far beyond the usual formal treatises on primitive belief and magic.

The Manus are ancestor worshippers, and high inside the door of each house rests the skull of the recently dead father or elder brother who is tutelary deity of the house owner. He protects his ward, gives

him good fishing, and exacts from him the most far-reaching rectitude of behavior, which involves a Puritanical code of sex morality and a meticulous economic probity. Any misfortune, any illness in the family, is due to some breech of rectitude, or to some clash between families which has been taken up by the tutelary ghosts; and oracles and diviners—acting by inspiration, but quite in their right minds—state the strife or the lapses that have called down the visitation. For these, compensation must be made to the human person injured, not to the ghosts or to their oracles. These lapses, such is the usual strict adherence to the moral code, are almost always such missteps as having fulfilled a more pressing economic obligation instead of a less pressing, or having accidentally seen a person of the opposite sex exposed even when a man and woman under cover of night have both dashed into the water to save a baby each thought was theirs. As soon as these sins are expiated by public confession and payment, the tutelary ghost forgives, and if death nevertheless follows it is said to be due to the malice of some other household's Ghost.

Manus religion, therefore, is wholly episodic. It has no calendric rites, no priestly offices, no crisis ceremonial. Whenever there is an illness, whenever there is an accident, the supernatural forces must be consulted and appeased in reference to the current event, and every incident of village life must be scrutinized in order to render account to the supernaturals. For this reason Dr. Fortune's account necessarily describes each event, the charges and counter-charges, the complications between neighbors, the guilt and protests. It is a method that would not be necessary if the Manus had a sacerdotal religion with calendric ceremonies, and it drives home the great amount of human content in this Manus religion. We are far away here from a form of religion which operates through symbols and sympathetic magic; instead, each religious issue turns upon the obligations it is necessary to fulfill toward one's fellowmen, and religion means the public threshing out of these obligations. As Dr. Fortune says, Manus religion concentrates its attention upon "setting man right with man as a way of setting man right with the supernatural." The obligation it lays on its worshippers is to keep the moral code. The Manus people are quarrelsome and capitalistic, but they "are probably as honest and fair-dealing a people as exist anywhere. If a person is of normal intelligence, he is utterly reliable. All of them were engaged in an

endeavor to keep a very stringent sex code with a very great measure of success."

The form which religion has taken in Manus is in marked contrast to the religions of the surrounding area, at least to those of which anything is known. Widespread practices, such as the skull cult of the recent dead, oracles given by women whose controls are their own dead children, the curse by the sister's line upon the brother's, have here been integrated into an ethical religion congenial to these hard-bitten primitive Puritans. Their ancestor worship involves a thoroughgoing identification of the Ghost and his ward; what insults one of them will insult the other. And worship terminates when the bond is broken by death, for a Ghost which has not been able to prevent the death of his ward has lost all claim upon the living. The skull which has been his symbol is cast out "to be washed by all rains, scorched by all suns," and the skull of the newly dead is tutelary in his place to the survivor who is now head of the household.

As Dr. Fortune points out, Manus religion is an excellent corrective to such evolutionary schemes as Tylor proposed, according to which the evolution of religion had proceeded from non-moral ancestor worship and polytheistic cult to the coalescence of religion and morals under monotheism. Dr. Fortune's account presents for one primitive people the kind of full, carefully documented material upon which valid psychological and sociological studies of divergent religions must be based.

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La Confessione dei peccati. By RAFFAELE PETTAZZONI. Bologna: Nicola Zanichelli, 1929, 1935, 1936. Pp. xii + 355, xi + 365, x + 294. (*La Confession des péchés.* Traduit par R. Monnot. Paris, Librairie Ernest Leroux, 1931, 1932. Pp. xi + 306, 245.)

The publication of volume three of this monumental work makes it opportune at this time to review the general enterprise Professor Pettazzoni has undertaken and to call attention to his significant interpretation of one of the basic problems in the history of religion and morality. Though the entire encyclopedia of confession, as the work might be called, which Professor Pettazzoni projected in his communication to the Sixth Congress on the History of Religions, Bruxelles,

1935, has not been completed, these three volumes are a unit, are provided with a general index, and arrive at a general theory which makes it quite clear that subsequent volumes, if they should appear, will only offer further documentation and illustration of the ideas developed in the first three. Volume one covers Primitive Cultures, Ancient America, Shinto, Taoism and the Imperial Confession in China, Brahmanism, Jainism, and Buddhism. The section on primitive religions is greatly amplified in the French edition of this volume (1931); both the range of particular cultures studied and the theoretical discussion of the anthropological problems involved are a great improvement over the Italian edition. Volume two covers Egypt, Babylonia, Israel and Southern Arabia; Volume three, Syria, the Hittites, Asia Minor, and Greece. In each of these fields Professor Pettazzoni has made an admirable selection of the most important documents and crucial instances, without attempting an outline of the whole history of the confession of sins. The work is profusely documented throughout, a model of painstaking scholarship.

The fact that instances of confession are here gathered from every clime and every age may lead the captious reader to infer that this religious practice is universal. The author himself, however, makes no such claim. It might have been instructive, especially in treating of primitive cultures, to have presented for purposes of comparison several cultures (and there are many) where nothing analogous to confession, sin or guilt exists. On the other hand, it is abundantly clear even from the positive data given by Professor Pettazzoni that the concept of sin is a relatively late product of confession. Confession is older than sin. Following Frazer's general interpretation of the relation between magic and religion, the author takes pains to prove that in the most primitive societies confession is a magic rite of purification. The efficacy of the rite rests on the belief that the contaminating substance can be evoked, that the utterance of words is accompanied by the elimination of the evil substance or *miasma* (usually a fluid). This magic rite is therefore based on what Professor Pettazzoni calls the substantial notion of sin, and his chief theme is to show how survivals of this primitive notion and the practices accompanying it have persisted among those peoples who succeeded in moralizing or subjectifying the idea of sin, and in transforming automatic purification into theistic sacrifice and prayer. To illustrate his method and

conclusions, I cite several paragraphs from his chapter on Israel (chapter X, pp. 268 ff.).

The notion of a sin that is unwilled and unknown accompanies Hebrew religion during the whole of its millennial career. We have already met it among many other peoples, especially among the uncivilized. In fact, it derives ultimately from primitive magic, as well as religion, where sin is conceived as the violation of a sacred order, of a system of forces occultly inherent in things, in certain things, and as emanating from them, when the order is violated, in the form of a malignant fluid by a purely automatic power, so that it is natural that the intention and willingness of the violator has nothing to do with it. And if even in the heart of theistic religion, even as the transgression of a god's law, sin can be involuntary, that is, involuntary by reason of its objectivity, this is, in a way, the theistic equivalent of the primitive, non-theistic and magical idea of substantiality, since it too is free of subjective elements. The fact is that voluntary sin does not appear originally as something distinct, but as clearly associated with the kind of sin that is unwilled and unknown, and the two together are used to represent the totality of sins, frequently, as almost a synthetic formula, embracing the two categories of voluntariness and involuntariness. Thus in the Shinto *norito* recited in the *oho-harahi* sins are mentioned as "both the inadvertent and the deliberate"; in a Vedic hymn pardon is asked of Varuna for sins committed "both really (i.e. consciously) and unwittingly," as also in a Brahmanic text accompanying one of the rites of *agnistoma* there is a request for the elimination of "the sin committed consciously and the unconscious sin"; and in the Babylonian "penitential psalms" the formula recurs persistently of "the sin I know and the sin I do not know"; which are so many noteworthy parallels to the Old Testament contrast between voluntary and involuntary sins.

But it is only when voluntary sin succeeds in defining completely the idea of sin, to the exclusion of the involuntary, that the primitive conception can be said to have been really overcome. This achievement, which came in India not with Jainism (this fact being but one illustration of the generally archaistic character of that religion) but only with Buddhism, came in Israel with the prophets—gradually. In fact, in the oldest prophets there persists a residuum of the archaic ideology in the dogma of the solidarity of the people and the individual in sin and its consequences and in their transmission to succeeding generations, so that the Deuteronomic historiography, inspired by prophetic currents, is one grand variation on this theme; and not until Ezekiel does the individualistic formula of individual moral responsibility appear clearly. . . . And just as in Buddhism the primitive conception of sin, early overcome, reappeared in its later history, so in Israel it was not entirely and forever overcome by the prophets. There persisted long, especially in popular religions, even after Job, that other dogma (widespread in the whole ancient East) that evil is the revealing

sign of sin, not only for others but even for him who committed it, if he committed it unwittingly and unwillingly. And we have seen how large a role in the Law the idea of involuntary sin plays, and this fact, in turn, agrees with the cultic emphasis that found its triumph in the Law, since it was precisely in cultic and sacred matters that there is the greatest danger of involuntary and unconscious sin. On the other hand, the fact that in the Law specific sacred expiations are prescribed only for involuntary sins, the voluntary sins being by nature inexpiable and hence more serious, is an evaluation *sui generis*, but nevertheless an evaluation based on the ethical element and an approximation to the recognition of voluntary sins as not merely the most serious kind of sin, but the only kind of sin, which recognition marks, as we said, the complete overcoming of the archaic tradition. . . .

Since confession is likewise a primitive element, it too had to reckon with Jahwism. One of the typical features of primitive confession is to have as its chief, almost exclusive subject sexual sins. This is a consequence of its elementary function as a magic eliminatory rite connected with the substantial nature of sin, which nature is most relevant to sexual sins for physiological reasons. . . . In fact, sexual sin is of secondary importance in the Old Testament, compared with the typical Jahwistic sin of idolatry. Hence the traces of the sexual emphasis which we find in Hebrew confession are all the more symptomatic and significant, for sexual impurities, both individual and collective, are in the Old Testament among those which imply involuntary sin (and perhaps confession).

Another characteristic trait of primitive confession is the specification of the sin committed. This too is related to the eliminatory rite with which confession is associated in the evocation of sin. . . . This trait is also missing in Hebrew confession (and for this reason, too, there can be no confession of sexual sin as such). Hebrew confession consists generally of a generic declaration of guilt. . . . Even when under exceptional circumstances, especially for the sin of idolatry, the sin committed is specified, it is usually introduced or accompanied by the generic declaration of guilt. . . . This helps us to understand how the confession for the sins of the people (necessarily totalitarian) made over the scape-goat, though it possibly consisted at first in the recital of a list of sins, could be supplanted by a generic confessional formula. . . . In individual confession as well the specification of the sins committed was very rare. . . .

If Hebrew confession had been as a whole a product of Jahwism, a genuine Jahwistic expression of repentance and inner contrition, would it not have taken a more conspicuous place among the prophets, the most rigorous representatives of Jahwism and of a purely inner religion? If, on the other hand, they ignored it, they did so because of their anti-cultic tendency, which confirms, therefore, the cultic character of confession. Even as a generic declaration of guilt Hebrew confession has a sacred and liturgical character, which is reflected . . . by the confessional forms, "I have sinned," "we have sinned." And if, even in the Law, where the

cultic emphasis triumphs, confession is secondary, this is to be explained by the fact that the cultus of the Law even in its expiatory practices is based entirely on sacrifices, whereas confession represents a different type of cultus, namely, cathartic-eliminatory, which continued in the midst of Jahwism.

Apart from Professor Pettazzoni's chief theme, the evolution of the confession of sins from cathartic magic, two subsidiary conclusions disclosed by his analysis are worthy of note and critical discussion. One is that sexual sins constitute much the most important subject-matter of primitive confession. This predominant concern over the violation of sexual tabus Professor Pettazzoni attributes to two chief factors: sexual violations of sacred order are usually committed in secret and their publication by means of evocation or confession would naturally be regarded as the first step, at least, in removing the evil consequences; and, secondly, sex relations are so obviously in need of regulation that the primitive mind is naturally haunted by the fear of the consequences of the inevitable violations, which are usually frequent and often involuntary. Whatever the explanation may be, the fact seems undeniable that sexual violations are the subject-matter *par excellence* of confession. This fact, together with Professor Pettazzoni's assertion that primitive peoples are well aware of the *practical* need of sex regulation, seems to me difficult to reconcile with the theory, adhered to by the author, that primitive sins were usually "not evil in themselves" and that the tabus violated are usually irrational, a mere "sacred order" imposed by the arbitrary theories of magic. Why could one not argue to the contrary, that tabus which seem to us absurd are usually not mere sacred prescriptions but attempts at medicine, social hygiene and law, that there is a genuinely secular aspect to the primitive sense of guilt, in short, that the ritual confessions or religion were developed from medical and legal practices? The positivistic thesis that morality is being gradually secularized, that in its primitive form it was wholly a by-product of magic, and is gradually transformed from "*sacralità*" to "*moralità*" needs considerable revision. In many cases, as, for instance, in the case of the ancient confessions of Phrygia and Lydia (vol. III, p. 89), Professor Pettazzoni is able to prove that a moralistic confession had at an earlier time a more ritualistic nature. But such cases hardly warrant the general assumption that the kind of confession practised in law courts or in informal personal relations is ultimately derived from the purificatory

rites of magic. It seems at least equally plausible, in view of the evidence, that along with the eliminatory rites, there has always existed a practice of moral or legal confession. Professor Pettazzoni cites the case of King David, and others, where the confession is made to the person against whom the sin has been committed and says "in these cases confession is transferred from the religious and divine sphere to the sphere of the profane, the human and the political." (Vol. II, p. 155.) The distinction here seems to be based on the difference between confession made to the person wronged and, either magic evocation to no one in particular, or religious confession to a god. On this basis Professor Pettazzoni's volumes offer many illustrations from primitive cultures of secular confession, that is, of specific confessions to specific persons.

And this takes me to the second subsidiary theme of these volumes, namely, that there is a general evolution from the specific enumeration of specific violations (on which the efficacy of the magic rite depends) toward the generic confession of sinfulness or guilt, and that this sense of guilt is gradually rationalized until in its completely rational form sin is conceived as essentially voluntary, and hence the concept of sins committed unknowingly drops out. Following the general lines of idealistic moral theory, Professor Pettazzoni takes for granted that moral evolution proceeds from the substantial to the subjective view of sin, from the idea of evil external substances or forces to the idea of evil will. Hence, wherever he finds references to unknown sins (as in the case of the Hebrew rituals cited above) he infers the presence of "archaic" moral ideas. This seems to me a rather extreme interpretation of one aspect of confession. Is it not true that quite apart from magic theories an enlightened conscience is aware of the extent to which it is unaware of which acts are sins and which not? Would not any confession be inadequate that omitted reference to the shortcomings of the moral consciousness itself? Especially a confession made to God, the supreme judge of right and wrong, must reflect human humility before an assumed absolute standard.

Whether it is an evidence of moral progress, on the other hand, that confession becomes less specific, seems to me to raise a large and highly debatable issue. On this basis, the Calvinistic confession of total depravity would mark the high point of a religious confession. In one sense,

I am inclined to admit that such a confession marks the high point of piety, of humility, before an absolute judge, but at the same time it seems to me to mark the end of the utility of confession. The primitive, specific form of confession seems to me the most useful from the point of view of moral and mental hygiene. To come out into the open and admit that a given act was wrong is a highly beneficent purge. It is interesting to follow the course of Professor Pettazzoni's narrative from this point of view, and to notice how the so-called civilized religions progressively devise formulae for concealing instead of really confessing sins. To confess merely sinfulness, to circumvent thus the intellectual and moral labor of passing critical judgment on specific issues, is as immoral as it is comfortable. Religion thus becomes truly an opiate instead of a cathartic. It is especially interesting to note the influence of agriculture and of seasonal celebrations in effecting this degeneration, if such it is, of confession. Among the Mayas, in Brahmanism, in the Greek and Hebrew religions, there are outstanding examples of this transformation of a medical rite, if I may so term it, performed in an emergency for getting rid of a specific evil, into a seasonal celebration, performed at stated times for everyone and therefore implying a purely formal confession. This suggests, in short, that the healing power of religion is directly proportional to the specificity of its confessions. In the degree that Christians, or other primitive peoples for that matter, have invented ways of preventing their confessions from publishing their sins, in that degree secular forms of mental healing and analysis have become necessary. When religious institutions administer moral opiates, secular institutions must attend to the genuine cures.

If, on the contrary, we take the more conventional point of view and regard the "civilized" distinction between private and public morality as a genuine advance, we must revise our current notions, both religious and scientific, concerning the value of exposing sins. If the Protestant habit of refusing to confess what is a private matter to any one but God is a moral advance over the Puritan, collectivistic and psycho-analytic theories that privacy is itself unwholesome, why should we suppose that to have a clean conscience is better than to have an easy one? Certainly the Catholic practice of "secret auricular" confession is merely a compromise. Should religious confession "in the closet" help man to achieve a civilized sense of privacy, or should

open confession cleanse the soul by emptying it on the public? I suspect we have no very clear ideas on this subject nor very reliable information.

I have stressed the more philosophical and speculative issues raised by these volumes. But I must return in closing to remark that Professor Pettazzoni himself refrains from much generalizing and speculation. His volumes are valuable chiefly as a store-house of carefully sifted information. The wealth of this concrete material I can not hope even to suggest in this review. Especially interesting, it seems to me, is his description of confession in a Buddhist monastery and its function in preserving collective purity. Historians will probably value most his critical discussion of some of the difficult problems in the history of the ancient Near East, for in this field Professor Pettazzoni is an authority. And here, especially, his inquiries into the confession of sins have raised larger issues and thrown much light on the general history of certain cults, which are still mysterious enough, as, for example, those of the Hittites, of Samothrace, of Phrygia and Lydia, of *Magna Mater*, and of Sabazios. In general, the subject of confession becomes in Professor Pettazzoni's hands so significant, so crucial for the analysis of conscience, that these volumes are really a comprehensive inquiry into the relation between morals, religion, and health.

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The Buddhist Philosophy of Universal Flux. By SATKARI MOOKERJEE, M.A., Ph.D. University of Calcutta, 1935. Pp. xlvii + 448.

The author of this volume holds the title of Lecturer in Sanskrit, Philosophy and Pāli at Calcutta University. In the sub-title he describes his work as "an exposition of the philosophy of critical realism as expounded by the School of Dignāga." More specifically, it is "an attempt to give a critical exposition of the Medieval school of Buddhism that was ushered into existence by Dignāga and Dharmakīrti, and later on systematized and developed by Śāntarakṣita, Kamalaśīla, Ratnakīrti and other authors of repute" (p. xxxv). Interest in the subject arises from the fact that Buddhist philosophy of the Mahāyāna schools in the fourth and fifth centuries A.D. developed keen instruments of logical criticism which placed all Indian thought movements under the necessity of systematic reconstruction. This aggressively

polemical Buddhism was the powerful reagent which precipitated what Professor Radhakrishnan calls "the six Brahmanical systems" in India and laid the rational foundations for the Buddhism of China, Japan, and Tibet.

In method of exposition Mr. Mookerjee does not follow the genetic historical form with which the Western reader is familiar in the writings of Dr. Vidyābhūṣaṇa, Surendranath Dasgupta and Professor Radhakrishman. The significance of the origin and development of the ideas within the wider Indian scene is not a matter of main concern. Instead, the reader is introduced directly into the arena of dialectical conflict and allowed to become acquainted with the ideas as they are being tested amid the stresses and strains of critical debate. The very first chapter plunges him into the problem of the nature of existence, and reveals the Buddhist contending for universal flux and impermanence against Naiyāyikas, Vaibhāṣikas, Uddyotakara, Kumārila and other serious foes whose arguments represent a considerable spread in time. With similar close convergence of materials other chapters handle theories of causation, of universals, of the import of words, of existence or non-existence of soul, of nirvāṇa, of perception and other concepts in logic and epistemology. The career of the ideas in logic is thus thrown into strong relief apart from all questions of psychological origin or temporal development. What the method lacks in historical perspective, however, is perhaps made up by the more vivid realization and portrayal of the clash of ideas under dominating problems of thought. It enables Mr. Mookerjee to draw freely upon his sources according to the logical requirements of each conception and to heighten the dramatic tension between systems by accumulating what is relevant to each problem in one place. It also enables him to hold to his purpose of being faithful to the ideas of the Medieval Buddhists while presenting them to the modern mind in an intelligible form. The result is that the reader is spared the technicalities of a too close historical literalism at the same time he is given grounds for wholesome respect toward the genuine philosophical issues at stake.

The title of the volume derives from the Buddhist Sautrāntika contention, basic to the whole exposition, that all entities are momentary and perishing, ceaselessly rising and passing away. Impermanence and transitoriness are integral to existence. Ignorance of this fact and

failure to adjust thereto is bondage (bandha): realization of it is release (mokṣa). Highest wisdom is in the insight that change, flux, flow is universal. Dogmatically the conception is easy to state, but the storm of criticism it evoked from other religious teachers (Naiyāyikas especially) who held to some eternal entities or verities, permanent in the midst of change, caused the Buddhists to elaborate in counter-argument numerous subsidiary concepts. It became necessary to show that so-called imperishable entities—space, time, God and the like—are ideal fictions; that causal efficiency cannot be predicated of permanent entities; that a permanent cause is a contradiction in terms. Logical difficulties had to be explained; how two contradictory qualities, e.g., seed vs. sprout, can co-exist in one and the same substratum, how negation presupposes not real but conceptual existence in the thing denied, and how there can be real relation of contradictory opposition between two terms (e.g. permanence and change) even if one of the terms (permanence) connotes a fictitious entity. Objections urged against universal impermanence on psychological and metaphysical grounds likewise had to be met. Thus the opposition argued that if everything is momentary and there is no abiding self or ego-principle through the series of momentary events constituting an individual, then moral responsibility as expressed in the law of *karman* is rendered absurd, for no intelligent being, if momentary, can be expected to concern himself with results which will accrue, not to himself, but to another. The Buddhist counters with the reply that good and bad results following upon good and bad actions, which is the real meaning of moral causality, simply constitute a fact operating from moment to moment which does not need the hypothesis of a permanent self-substrate acting as agent apart from the phenomenon. Such are some of the many-branched considerations arising from the Buddhist's adherence to the doctrine of a fluxional ontology. They are of the domain of Heraclitus and Bergson in Western thought.

Mr. Mookerjee's exposition further shows how powerfully the Medieval Buddhists cut their way through the barbed dialectical entanglements laid by their rivals. The severe and high debate is pressed with unremitting zeal and there is inexhaustible energy in the search for suitable verbal distinctions to carry the proliferating ideas. Necessities of argument bring on judgments in logic. As against realists of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika and the Mīmāṁsaka schools the

Buddhists insist that universals are subjective constructions and that words referring to them relate to no objective realities existing in their own right. The sources of valid knowledge are investigated by Dignāga and Dharmakīrti and reduced to two, viz., perception and inference. A theory of the syllogism is developed in which the Buddhists replace older, clumsier forms having five or even ten members with a simpler form of only two members—"the universal proposition with the example tagged on, and the minor premise." In the many discussions involved here, readers acquainted with similar problems in Western philosophy will find food for meditation on the question whether or not the human mind has a detectable and statable ultimate form of logic.

In its religious bearings, the doctrine of the universal flux presents a conception of after-life and ultimate destiny cast in terms wholly dynamic. While rejecting all notions of an eternal soul entity, (whether conceived by the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas, the Mīmāṁsakas, the Digambaran Jainas, the Sāṅkhyas, the Vātsīputriyas, or the Vedāntins, each of which is refuted in turn) the Buddhists hold, nevertheless, that there is unbroken continuity in the stream of the momentary units of consciousness which constitute a person, and that nirvāṇa is no condition of annihilation and extinction. The final consummation devoutly wished by the good Buddhist, as eventually explained by Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla, is a completely purified stream of consciousness (santāna) wherein all forms of ignorance, passion and defilement have ceased to be. Free from even the slightest tinge of pain, suffering or impurity, no longer troubled by concern for some illusory, changeless ego behind the stream, nor agitated by the distinction of subject and object, such consciousness endures endlessly, blissfully, actively, apparently in some unbroken, impersonal intuition of reality itself, or perhaps better, of itself as reality. Here we see the conception of momentariness and universal flux conserved but without denial of positive religious values as hostile critics would maintain who charged the Buddhists with teaching absolute extinction as the final fate of man. A static, eternally changeless ego is indeed rejected, but this conceptual loss, so thinks the Buddhist, is great gain; for, as is said in one ancient text quoted by Kamalaśīla, "This (idea) is a veritable terror to the soft intellect, but it dissolves the fears of the wise" (p. 265).

Questions of content aside, it is a matter of some puzzlement why Mr. Mookerjee in his sub-title chooses to designate the philosophy of Dignāga's school as a "critical realism." Dignāga (or Diṅnāga, according to another transcription) is usually reckoned among the great teachers of the Vijñaptimātravāda, or radically idealistic school of Asaṅga and Vasubandhu. According to Tibetan tradition as presented in both Tāranātha and Bu-ston, he was an immediate disciple of Vasubandhu in Mahāyānist studies, and these, as is well known, mark the idealistic phase of the master's own thought. Furthermore Dignāga's Alambanaparīkṣā-śāstra is listed by the Chinese commentator K'uei Chi among the twelve śāstras supportive of Vasubandhu's idealistic system as presented in Hsüan Tsang's Ch'eng-wei-shih-lun.* Why then dub his philosophy as realism? Mr. Mookerjee's explanation in his Introduction (p. xlvi), that he is using the term in a Kantian sense to mean that the categories of thought and reality are "a priori subjective concepts," is not wholly convincing, for he immediately recognizes that while Kant still retains a thing-in-itself external to sensation the Buddhist insists "on the evidentiary value of sensation in which the thing-in-itself (svalakṣaṅa) is believed to be presented in its pure and unsullied character." But it is precisely the contention of the Vijñaptimātravādins, as we can now see in the light of recently recovered texts of Vasubandhu, his Viṁśatikā and Triṁśikā, that the pure and unsullied character of the thing-in-itself is of the very stuff of the stream of consciousness. It is difficult to see how "realism" or even "critical realism" can apply without a considerable wrench in meaning. The fact is that the doctrine of flux which is central to this study was held both by the Sautrāntikas who believed in a world external to consciousness and by the Vijñānavādins who denied extra-mental existence in the object of knowledge. While Dignāga holds to the Sautrāntika position in logic and epistemology he is a Vijñānavādin in metaphysics, as Mr. Mookerjee himself recognizes in discussing the concept of nirvāṇa (p. 256). One therefore questions whether the subtitle of the volume is not unnecessarily restrictive in view of the actual contents. The full sweep of Dignāga's school of thought overflows the limits of our Western categories.

This point of verbal characterization, however, does not prejudice the value of Mr. Mookerjee's book for lay readers in the field of

* See Sylvain Lévi: Matériaux pour l'étude du Système Vijñaptimātra, p. 32.

Buddhist philosophy. He makes live again for us the mature conflict of rivaling streams of thought amid which the Medieval Buddhists strove for spiritual survival in days when the Mahāyāna system met its severest tests at the bar of reflective reason.

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Muhammed als Religionsstifter. By KARL AHRENS. Abhandlungen für die Kunde des Morgenlandes herausgegeben von der Deutschen Morgenländischen Gesellschaft, XIX. Band, No. 4. Leipzig, 1935: Deutsche Morgenlandische Gesellschaft. In Kommission bei F. A. Brockhaus. Pp. viii + 216.

Professor Ahrens seeks to establish the thesis that Mohammed not only received the first impact from Christianity, but was also predominantly under Christian influence during the greater part of the Meccan period (p. vii). The thesis is not entirely new. Wellhausen[1] is most emphatic in stating that Islam was rooted in Christianity, and that the leaven did not come from Judaism, although the subsequently added flour for the most part did. Schwally,[2] too, is inclined to think that Islam is essentially a religion that follows in the footsteps of Christianity; and Smith[3] arrives at the conclusion that "the impulse came from Christianity."

The objection to such an assumption is the fact that the name of the founder of the Christian faith, which we should thus expect to find in the earliest Suras of the Koran, is not mentioned till Sura 19, which belongs to the second Meccan period. Rudolph[4] tries to override this difficulty by claiming that the early Meccan Sura (112), though not naming Jesus, presupposes Mohammed's knowledge of him. Thus he construes its third verse "He (Allah) begets not and is not begotten" as a polemical utterance against Christianity. The objection that the reference is not to Jesus but to the special deities thought to be the daughters of Allah (Sura 16, 59; 37, 152) he parries by the rather ineffectual remark that v. 4 of that Sura "There is no one like unto Him" should be taken as an allusion to the alleged Godhead of Jesus.

[1] *Reste Arab. Heidentums*, Berlin, 2nd ed., 1897, p. 242.
[2] *Geschichte des Qorans*, Leipzig, 1909-1919, vol. 1, p. 8.
[3] *The Bible and Islam*, New York, 1897, p. 315.
[4] *Die Abhängigkeit d. Qorans von Judentum u. Christentum*, Stuttgart, 1922, p. 64.

I should add that an intimation as to God being unborn is already found in Philo's *De Iosepho*, 43, and the expression as to God not begetting and not being begotten, in refutation of a pagan belief, is also recorded in the Jewish Sibylline Fragments, to wit: "There is one God . . . unbegotten (I, 7) . . . but if the gods have offspring and yet remain immortal, there would have been more gods born than men" (II, 1.2). Thus Mohammed may not only have referred to idol-worshippers in S. 112, but may have even borrowed the utterance. Nevertheless the arguments against a reference to Jesus in S. 112 are not absolutely convincing. The reference there, in view of Sura 5, 19; 6, 101; 9, 30, may after all be to Jesus. However, the matter is very doubtful. To crown it all, Bell[5] unceremoniously doubts whether the Sura is really one of the earliest.

I should add another equally valid objection to the author's thesis. We meet with two flagrant anachronisms in the Koran, Haman being represented as the contemporary of Pharaoh (Sura 28, 38; 40, 38), and Miriam, the sister of Moses, as the mother of Jesus (Sura 19, 16-29; 64, 12). The Koranic Haman being a relatively unimportant personage, the anachronism is somehow pardonable. Moreover, being an enemy of Israel, his juxtaposition with Pharaoh is understandable (Sura 28, 5.7; 29, 38; 40, 25). But the confusion of Mary with Miriam involves such a basic misconception of the time-element in Christianity that it precludes the possibility that Mohammed, during the early Meccan period, regarded Jesus as the founder of a new faith. To all appearances, he looked upon Jesus at that time as a great nephew of two great uncles, Aaron and Moses. These were brothers. So he must have thought that in the house of Amram, as in the house of Abraham, prophecy "ran in the family." It is inconceivable how Mohammed could have been led to such an impression about Christianity from conversation with *bona fide* Christians. It is equally unimaginable how he could have received it from Jews. It is not otherwise than that Mohammed must have drawn upon some distorted Jesus stories current among his compatriots in Mecca, and then possibly further disfigured them by figments of his own. And so there was no authoritative transmission of Christian doctrine in Arabia at that particular period of Mohammed's career, save a hazy tradition afloat. We witness a similar phenomenon among the Arabs of our own

[5] *The Origin of Islam in its Christian Environment*, London, 1926, p. 67.

day. Here is an account of European history which Musil[6] obtained from Prince al-Nuri, chief of the Rwala bedouins: "Franj (France) is the family still reigning over all Europe. As Eben Sa'ud rules a large territory and various tribes, so the Franj have held under their sway many tribes like the Alman (Germans), Namsa (Austrians), Ṭalyan (Italians), Inkliz (English), Rusiya (Russians) . . . and others. Very many years ago the Rum (Greeks) threw off their yoke, and this is the reason why they are called Rum and not Franj. The Inkliz also have won a good deal of independence and are guided according to their own counsel and will; but by some they are still counted among the Franj . . . "Certainly Musil's informant could not have received this ethnological gem directly from a European, or, for that matter, from any man having a modicum of information concerning the political situation in Europe. It is hollow rumor confounded in the crucible of isolation, not unlike the notions about Christianity which prevailed in Arabia in the beginning of the 7th century. Consequently, postulating Christian mentors for Mohammed in his home town on the basis of some Meccan Suras would be tantamount to saying that Prince al-Nuri was instructed in European events by an Englishman or Frenchman. The same holds true of direct Jewish influence in the early Meccan period, but to a lesser degree. At least the confusion here is not so great. Indeed, a more distorted story than that of the life of Jesus is not to be found in the whole of the Koran.

Thus much for general considerations. As for establishing the thesis on the basis of accumulative evidence, the method primarily consists in finding Christian parallels to detached Koranic passages and phrases. There is nothing wrong with that as far as it goes. But the validity of the individual proof is impaired, if the adduced parallel is also found in the O.T. In that case there is no telling whether the Koranic account percolated into Arabia through a Jewish or Christian channel, and this impediment in the path of the investigation the author himself admits *passim*. But there also lurks another no less serious difficulty. When the parallel does not go back to the O.T., and is found in Christian sources only, the result seems to have been attained, but this is far from being the case. It is an indubitable fact, but unfortunately very seldom taken into consideration, that the attempts to determine the bearing of the Apocryphal, Hellenistic and Rabbinic lit-

[6] *Arabia Deserta*, New York, 1927, p. 442.

eratures on the Koran have been not only inelaborate but meagre. If for no other reason, the sheer vastness of the Jewish material has discouraged systematic research on a large scale. It follows that when the student of the Christian origins of Islam does not find Jewish quotations corresponding to Christian ones in the secondary sources, i.e., in works dealing with Jewish influence on the Koran, he generally takes it for granted that the path is clear, and thus regards his evidence as unilateral and unchallengeable. A few examples, culled from the present book, will suffice to show how erroneous this assumption is.

The *yawm al-akhir* (last day) is equated (p. 97) with ἐσχάτη ἡμέρα (John 6, 39.40.44). But compare the phrase in Sifre[7] in connection with Deut. 34, 2: "Do not read *ha-yam he-aḥaron* (the last sea) but *ha-yom ha-aḥaron* (the last day). It is therefore to be inferred that He showed him (Moses) the entire world since the day it was created until *the day on which the dead will arise.*"

The view that the souls after death sleep in God's presence (pp. 98-99) is considered Christian, but it is also Jewish. Cf. IV Ezra 7, 95: "They understand the rest which they now, being gathered in their chambers, enjoy in profound quietness guarded by angels . . ."

The author, following Horovitz,[8] considers *firdaws* to be a Christian loan-word (p. 105). However, cf. Ḥag. 14b. On the interpretation of this passage, we must unqualifiedly agree with Ginzberg:[9] "There can be no doubt that the journey of the 'four' to paradise, like the ascension of Enoch (in the pre-Christian books of Enoch) and of so many other pious men, is to be taken literally and not allegorically. The conception . . . of the *baraita* is supported by the use of the phrase *niknas le-pardes* (entered paradise) since *niknas le-gan eden* (entered the Garden of Eden = paradise) was a common expression. . . . It means that Elisha ben Abuyah, like Paul, in a moment of ecstasy beheld the interior of heaven." In addition, the Samaritan Targum translates *ha-gan* (Gen. 2, 9) *pardesa* and *gan be-ʿeden* (Gen. 2, 8) *pardes be-ʿeden*. This shows that the word was used by all the three sects in Palestine. It is therefore impossible to prove a specific influence for it.

According to the author (pp. 114-115), *Jahiliyya* does not denote

[7] Ed. Friedmann, 357, p. 149a.
[8] *Jewish Proper Names in the Koran*, p. 197. (Hebrew Union College Annual, 1925, vol. 2, pp. 145-227).
[9] *Jewish Enc.* vol. 5, p. 138, art. Elisha ben Abuyah.

the "period of barbarism" but like *χρόνους τῆς ἀγνοίας* (Acts 17, 30; 1 Peter 1, 14) the "period of ignorance (of God)," i.e., the period of idolatry. The word occurs four times in the Koran (Sura 3, 148; 5, 55; 33, 33; 48, 26). In the first two instances it is difficult to decide which meaning to adopt, but Sura 33, 33; 48, 26, militate against the translation chosen by the author. In the former, the expression *al-Jahiliyya al-ula* (the first *Jahiliyya*) implies at least two periods of distinct Jahiliyyas. To be sure, Mohammed did not possess the cultural background or interest to fit paganism into periods of time, whereas he may have reacted warily and objectively to the tribal stories reflecting the changing customs of his people. In this connection, the doctrine of *tempora mutantur* could be used conveniently only in its vaguest application, but it would be certainly unwise politically to indulge in a classification of paganism. In order to leave paganism without a semblance of relative merit, all Jahiliyyas had to be equally bad, in fact so uniformly bad as to be indistinguishable for badness.[10]

One might argue that the differentiation is not one between pagan faiths but pagan peoples, and of these Mohammed knew not a few. But it is clear from the context that the expression does not involve non-Arabs. And this consideration clinches the matter beyond doubt. For the implied demarcation of the Jahiliyyas as *idololatria prima et secunda* thus presupposes in the interval a prophetic mission to the Arabs before Mohammed, but nothing could be further from Mohammed's mind than this. It was a political axiom with him that as an Arab apostle he had no precursor and would have no successor.

As for Sura 48, 26, *ḥamiyya* there can denote nothing else than the zeal and emotional call to fulfill the time-honored tribal usages in defiance of self-control and the better counsel of deliberation; and this would be the basic characteristic of *Jahiliyya*, the word with which *ḥamiyya* is coupled, if we regard *Jahiliyya* as an *nisba* of *jahil* in its primary sense, "lacking in restraint," not in its secondary connotation, "ignorant." That the original sense of *JHL* is "lack of restraint," Goldziher[11] has proved conclusively and indisputably. What is contested is the assumption that Mohammed employed *Jahiliyya* in its

[10] The *ἄγνοια προτέρα* in Simil. V, VII, 3, of Hermae Pastor, though outwardly resembling the expression *al-Jahiliyya al-ula*, has an entirely different meaning in the context, and would be irrelevant to the discussion, no matter how we interpret *Jahiliyya*. See Horovitz, *Koranische Untersuchungen*, Berlin, 1926, p. 61, n. 2.

[11] *Muhammedanische Studien*, Halle, 1889-1890, vol. I, pp. 219-228.

primary sense. Thus Lidzbarski[12] bluntly remarks that the other forms of *JHL* in the Koran are invariably employed in contrast to *'ilm*, "knowledge." Now this is an entirely unwarranted statement. Nöldeke[13] asserts that only in one case is *JHL* employed in contradistinction to "knowledge," and that in the rest of the cases it signifies "sin, folly," which in turn may be reduced to *ḍalal*, "erring." The latter signification, Nöldeke continues, fits in with the conception of *Jahiliyya*, "a state without divine guidance," hence it is to be equated with ἄγνοια of the N.T., by which term it could hardly have been uninfluenced.

My subjective impression is that *JHL* is in none of its contexts opposed to "knowledge," and that while its sense may seem doubtful in ten instances,[14] the rendering "ignorant, idolater" would be highly unsatisfactory, if not altogether unintelligible, in the remaining ten cases.[15] In these last passages *JHL* would make sense only, if taken to mean "passionate, improvident, lacking in self-control." These significations approach "*Thor, Sünder*," as given by Nöldeke. A thorough analysis of all the passages concerned cannot be undertaken here, but what may be readily seen is that the connection between "sin, folly" and *Jahiliyya* is not direct; to effect the union, *ḍalal* has to be the mediating conception, while according to the other view, "passion, improvidence, etc." link directly with *Jahiliyya*.

But granted even that *Jahiliyya* = *religious* ἄγνοια, Christian influence (Michaelis,[16] Nöldeke, Wellhausen[17]) is thereby not yet established. We find ἄγνοια in reference to idolaters in the Wisdom of Solomon[18] and in Philo's *De Monarchia*.[19] Lidzbarski[20] cites the gnostic ἀγνωσία in the identical signification. This does not exactly mean that some gnostic sects, versed in Hellenistic literature, had introduced the term into Arabia. The idea is self-suggestive to the monotheist, and the moralist would make it all inclusive. To quote

[12] *Zeitsch. f. Semitistik*, vol. 1, p. 94.
[13] WZKM, vol. 3, pp. 101-102.
[14] Sura 6, 35; 6, 111; 7, 134; 7, 198; 11, 31; 16, 120; 25, 64; 28, 55; 33, 72; 39, 64.
[15] Sura 2, 63; 2, 274; 4, 21; 6, 54; 11, 48; 12, 33; 12, 98; 27, 56; 46, 22; 49, 6.
[16] *Oriental. u. exeget. Bibliothek*, XVI, 1781, p. 3.
[17] *Reste Arab. Heidentums*, p. 67, n. 1.
[18] 14, 22 and 15, 11.
[19] 1 and 7.
[20] *Zeit. f. Semitistik*, vol. 1, p. 94.

Philo[21] again: "Ignorance is the primary evil of all the errors of the soul." This in turn is akin to the Rabbinic[22] saying "No man sins unless the spirit of madness (or folly, *shetut*) has entered into him." Also the Mishna[23] designates the idolworshippers as *shotim*. The biblical *da'at*, "knowledge," implies from its contexts in Isa. 11, 2; Hos. 4, 6; Prov. 1, 7, that idolatry was regarded as ignorance. Thus, even if *Jahiliyya* pertains to religious ἄγνοια the idea might still be either Jewish or indigenous.

"Beautiful deeds" (Sura 25, 70) is equated (p. 116) with καλὰ ἔργα (Matth. 5, 16), but the expression = the very common Rabbinic *ma'asim tobim*, or better yet *ma'asim na'im*.[24]

The meaning of *furqan* (p. 130) in Sura 2, 50; 3, 2; 21, 49; 25, 1, is generally understood to be "revelation." Hirschfeld,[25] who is of the opinion that the word mostly signifies "Torah," proposes to connect it with *peraqim*, into which the Pentateuch was divided for liturgical purposes. Margoliouth[26] proposes the Jewish *Pirqe Abot* (Sayings of the Fathers) as the pattern. But it is too much to presume that the word stands for any particular book; it therefore points rather to the Rabbinic *pirqa*,[27] "lecture" or *peruqa*,[28] "answer." But I think it more likely akin to the Syriac *me'ine de-furqana*, "springs of salvation," Athanasius[29] thus designating the Books of the Canon. This designation agrees exactly with the Koranic *furqan* in both form and meaning. To the above peculiar association of *purqana*, cited by the author in the ZDMG, 1930, p. 31, I would add the example of *purqana* in Bar Hebraeus' *Book of the Dove*,[30] where the latter quotes Mar Poman saying: "Likewise teachings of teachers who do not care for the *purqan* of their hearers but for the spoliation (*hulaṣ*) of their money." Here, too, because of its cryptic bearing on *ḤLṢ*, which may also denote "redemption," *purqan* certainly means "salvation," and it is used in reference to teaching.

[21] *De Ebrietate* 3.
[22] Soṭa 3a.
[23] Aboda Zara 4, 7.
[24] Ber. Rab. 71, 4; for other instances see Ber. Rab., ed. Theodor-Albeck, pp. 824-825.
[25] *New Researches*, London, 1902, p. 68.
[26] *Mohammed and the Rise of Islam*, New York, 1905, p. 145.
[27] Qiddushin 31b.
[28] Baba Qamma 117a.
[29] *Festal Letters*, ed. Cureton, p. 53.
[30] 3, 9; ed. Cardahi, p. 44.

However, it is evident that Athanasius' *me'ine de-furqana* is the equivalent of the Biblical *ma'yene ha-yeshu'a* (Isa. 12, 3). The verse reads there: "And ye shall draw water with joy out of the springs of salvation." The Talmud Yerushalmi[31] says in connection with it: "Why is (the well from which the water was drawn for libation on the Sukkot festival) called *Bet ha-Sho'eba*? Because from it they drew divine inspiration, as it is said: 'And ye shall draw (*u-she'abtem*) water with joy out of the springs of salvation.' " In other words, *she'abtem* stands in relation to "divine inspiration." *She'abtem* and *Sho'eba* are of the same linguistic root. Therefore the word *Sho'eba* must also be linked to "divine inspiration." This sort of homiletical syllogism is typical with the Rabbis. But this is not the point. What concerns us here is that the Rabbis had a preconceived definite idea as to what the metaphor in Isaiah stood for. The fact that they dispensed with an explanation of it proves in addition that "springs of salvation" = "divine inspiration" was common knowledge. The Targum also spiritualizes the passage, but in a modified manner, in adaptation to post-prophetic times. It thus paraphrases the verse in question: "And ye shall receive in gladness new instruction from the chosen righteous." Here the "springs of salvation" are those learned doctors who render original opinions and reveal unknown laws and traditions.

But Isa. 12, 3, is by no means the only place in which the Rabbis identify *YSh'* with "revelation." *Yesh'aka* in Ps. 51, 14, is also understood by them to refer to the *Shekina*[32] and "divine inspiration"[33] (*ru'ah ha-qodesh*). Moreover, *ge'ula*, "redemption," the synonym of *yeshu'a*, is also mentioned in Rabbinic literature in connection with instruction. We read thus in the *Pirqe Abot:*[34] "He who imparts teaching in the name of the original propounder causes redemption (*ge'ula*) to come to the world, as it is said: ('And it became known to Mordecai, and he told it unto Esther the queen), and Esther told it to the king *in the name* of Mordecai' " (Esther 2, 22). This statement evidently enlarges upon the theme in the Targum, in that it bestows redemption in transmitting even known traditions, provided their guarantor is conscientious. Furthermore, the comment in Megilla 7a that the phrase "it became known to Mordecai" means that "it was revealed to

[31] Sukka 5, 1.
[32] Yoma 22b.
[33] Midr. Tehillim, ed. Buber, 40, 4, p. 257.
[34] 6, 6.

him by divine inspiration" further links the Rabbis' interpretation of Esther 2, 22 to theirs of Isa. 12, 3.[35]

It may also be seen from the above examples that Mar Poman's linking of *purqan* to teaching accords with the Targum's special use of *yeshuʿa*, and that Athanasius' interpretation of it is virtually the same as that of the Talmud Yerushalmi. Indeed the very word *purqan* is found in such bearings in Rabbinic literature. Thus the Targum paraphrases Ps. 51, 14 (referred to above): "Restore Thine instruction unto me in order to rejoice in Thy *purqan*, and may the spirit of prophecy support me." It is evident that the Christian tradition goes back to the Jewish, and that the latter in turn is a dim recollection from the hoary past when the well was a place of judgment (Gen. 14, 7) and had its part in ordeals and omens.[36] But the question as to the medium through which the tradition passed on to Mohammed must obviously remain unanswered.

The above examples, of which some bear on the Meccan period, could be easily multiplied, if one systematically undertook to match a Jewish source for every Christian one quoted in the book. But had we even failed in this attempt, the author's thesis would still have remained unproved; for he has not subjected to comparison all Koranic statements of the Meccan period, but only a small portion of them, and furthermore such a portion as is not representative, for he has not picked the individual examples at random but mainly selected them in so far as he could secure Christian counterparts for them.

It is also to be regretted that Torrey's "Jewish Foundation of Islam"[37] whose thesis, of all theses on the subject, is diametrically opposed to that of the author, receives scarcely more than a bare mention in the *Nachträge* (p. 208). If the author thinks that it is not tenable, one should like to know the reason, especially when the presentation is admittedly *geistreich*.

May I add the following remarks?

Perles (p. 48, n. 1) is right in maintaining that the term *meshattef*, "polytheist," gained wider currency among the Jews in the later Middle Ages because of the added Koranic impetus. But this does not dis-

[35] See also the Targum Sheni on Esther 2, 22.

[36] For a parallel to the *Bet ha-Sho'eba* in the Ras Shamra Inscriptions and for the part of waters and springs in omens and ordeals see Montgomery, *Ras Shamra Notes V, A Myth of a Spring*, JAOS, vol. 56, pp. 226-227.

[37] New York, 1933.

prove the supposition that the earlier Rabbinic *meshattef* may have influenced the Koranic *mushrik*. In fact, a Rabbinic passage which, I think, has not yet been brought to bear on this topic, makes a clear distinction between an absolute idolworshipper and a polytheist who serves both God and idols. Thus the Rabbis[38] comment on the significance of "served Him not" in the verse "And the children of Israel . . . served the Be'alim . . . and they forsook the Lord, and served Him not (Judg. 10, 6): "They served Him not even *in association* (with the idols)."

That Iblis (pp. 93-4) is a corruption of διάβολος is open to grave objection. I have discussed the matter at length elsewhere,[39] where I proposed the equation Iblis = Beliar or Belial of the Apocrypha and the N.T. The influence might thus be either Jewish or Christian.

Idris (p. 128) = Andreas of the Alexander Romance is sheer arbitrariness. Elsewhere[40] I have identified Idris with Εὐδωρεσχος, the seventh antediluvian King according to Berossus, and with Enoch, the seventh antediluvian patriarch in Gen. 5. I have proposed the equation: Enoch (Biblical) = Εὐδωρεσχος (Berossus) = Enmeduranki (cuneiform records) = Idris (Mohammedan tradition) = Atlas (Pseudo-Eupolemos) > Dyris or Adyris (Strabo, Pliny, Solinus).

Fasting with Jews was never imposed as a penalty, as with Moslems. The Targum Yerushalmi (Gen. 37, 29) passage, adduced by the author (p. 170), does not prove the contrary. Reuben's fasting was not obligatory but self-inflicted. Moreover, Judaism imposed fasts upon the community as a whole or on a group within the community (the fast of the first-born on the day preceding Passover), but not on a particular individual. In the latter case, the ordinance would be impracticable. The transgression so punishable would not be serious enough in the great majority of cases to gain notoriety. Hence, only few would be likely to know of it, at most the neighbors and townsmen, and the culprit, by leaving for a strange locality, could thus undetectedly avoid the penalty. In its formative stage, Jewish law, like most law, was slowly fashioned on the anvil of deliberation, and by the combined wisdom of a body of jurists. Not so Mohammed's law. He frequently borrowed it; and when he did not, he improvised

[38] Midr. Rab., Esther, 3.
[39] *Macdonald Presentation Volume*, Princeton, 1933, pp. 156-157.
[40] Ibid., pp. 154-156.

it alone, and by impulse rather than by mature consideration. However, Mohammed is not directly to be blamed for the awkwardness of this law. It should be borne in mind that the Prophet's world was Medina (or Mecca), and there, where he legislated, everybody knew everybody. With the expansion of Islam, the law became automatically universal, and although ill-adapted to the new conditions, its Koranically inspired rigidity would not admit of modification.

Zakat (p. 180, n. 3). Horovitz[41] is to be credited for pointing out that *zakat*, "alms, poor rates," was not a peculiar specializing of the significance of the Jewish *zakut*, "merit, privilege, advantage," but the equivalent in meaning to that of the verb *zeka*, often used in the Talmud Yerushalmi[42] in the sense "to make a gift of." However, the meaning may be further traced to the Mishna. Cf. *mezakke et he-ʿani*[43] (the poor) and *she-yezakke bo lā-ʿaniyyim.*[44] The phrase must have been used extensively, so that in course of time *zakkot*, even without the object, came to suggest "almsgiving."

Yunus and Ilyas must not necessarily have come from the Greek by way of Ethiopic (p. 45). Horovitz[45] had already called attention to the fact that in Christian-Palestinian Aramaic Jonah = Yonas or Yunis. However, he failed to mention that Ilyas (Elijah) = Ilyas in the same dialect. It would be idle to argue that the Christian-Palestinian texts, being comparatively late, might have been influenced by the forms of the names in the Koran, for we find in them also Yoḥanis (Ιωαννης), which in the Koran = Yaḥya.

To conclude: both influences were undoubtedly at work; probably indirectly during the early Meccan period, but directly in the later one, when Mohammed's contacts with the outside world broadened considerably, and the progressive edification of his system necessitated more and more first hand information. But one should refrain from committing himself as to which impulse came first, or as to which influence was preponderant during the Meccan period or any of its subdivisions. To decide on that, nothing less than a comprehensive survey of both Christian and Jewish sources bearing on the Meccan

[41] *Jewish Proper Names*, p. 206.
[42] For copious illustrations see Dalman, *Grammatik d. Jüdisch-Paläst. Aramäisch*, Leipzig, 1925, p. 246.
[43] Pe'a 5, 2.
[44] Ma'aser Sheni 5, 9.
[45] *Koranische Untersuchungen*, p. 155.

period, with a careful analysis of the data brought to light, could warrant anything approaching proof, and such an exhaustive survey has not been made as yet. It is certainly not one man's job, but if a group of scholars would make it their task to treat the entire subject with the utmost thoroughness and precision, the problem would come nearer solution. In the meantime, every contribution, however one-sided and incomplete, is welcome; by discovering new material and reinterpreting the old, the way is paved for a possible decision in the future. But the individual writer must not attempt too much and must not overstate the case.

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Das Problem der Urkirche in der neueren Forschung. By Olof Linton. Uppsala: Almquist & Wiksells Boktryckeri, 1932. Pp. xxxii + 211. (No index but elaborate analysis of contents.)

For the subject of his inaugural dissertation at Uppsala, Olof Linton chose *Das Problem der Urkirche in der neueren Forschung*. This unique study is a survey of the critical investigation of the questions relating to the origin of the church during the half-century, 1880-1930. Eighteen pages of biblography do not suffice for an enumeration of the significant Protestant and Catholic articles and monographs devoted to this problem.

After evaluating the general Protestant theory of the church of the eighties, the author examines the views of Hatch, Harnack, and Sohm; notices the new-old definitions of apostles, prophets, teachers, bishop, presbyters, and deacons; traces the revaluation made necessary by the more recent exegetical, historical, psychological, and comparative research regarding the New Testament, classifies the current methods of defining the church; and concludes with a review and prospect incorporating his own conclusions.

The Protestant consensus of 1880 held that the earliest Christian churches were independent, autonomous, local corporations, societies, or meetings, enjoying natural, voluntary fellowship with one another to achieve common ends. There was no hierarchical organization in apostolic or sub-apostolic days. The separate congregations appointed their officers and assigned their functions. The church was governed by the people, the presbytery and something like a church board.

Bishops were presbyters. The law of the church was not *jure divino* but what was essential to the best interests of the separate churches. Certain second century crises produced the Catholic church.

The epoch of the brilliant trio, Hatch, Harnack, and Sohm was ushered in by the eight lectures of Edwin Hatch published in 1881. These described the development of the Christian churches as exceedingly gradual, contended that the essentials of the Christian organization were derived from existing societies, denied the identity of bishops and presbyters, assigned economic significance to the episcopacy, interpreting the bishop as the chief financial officer, and made the worshipping church the centre of the Christian scheme.

From a searching analysis of Hatch and of the contents of the newly discovered Didache, Harnack emerged with the hypothesis that the organization of the primitive church was twofold, comprising a universal, spiritual ministry not tied to any particular church and consisting of apostles, prophets, teachers, and a local ministry appointed by the local group and consisting of patriarchal, or presbyterial; administrative, or bishop-deacon; aristocratic, or martyr-ascetic sections. This construction seemed too arm-chair and involved for many to accept. Moreover, it was insisted that the spiritual, universal ministry could not possibly have been organized.

The main postulates of the Protestant consensus were rudely called in question by Rudolf Sohm whose point of departure was that the idea of universality attached to the idea of the church from its rise. A local group of Christians, moreover, represented the totality of Christians. Apostles, prophets, and teachers were called by God, not by men. They spoke, absolved, exercised discipline and ruled in place of God. The government of the church from its beginning was authoritative, monarchical, *jure divino*, not legal, disciplinary, social. The ecclesiastical organization was thus charismatic, that is, divine and not according to custom or law. The final source of all church order was revelation.

Ordination, said Sohm, was merely the congregation's agreement with the selection already made by God. Laying on of hands was a spiritual act, reënforcing the divine power within the candidate. The presbyter's rank of honor was due to his age and achievements. The plurality of bishops was due to the charismatic nature of his office. The Spirit might assign the bishop's function to another tomorrow. The bishop enjoyed no inherent right to his office.

Sohm's suggestions were indeed revolutionary, for he was substituting church for society, or corporation, and the church at worship for administration. The only early ecclesiastical law was *jure divino*. Christianity was inner experience of God and Christ, not external forms and formulas. Law and sovereignty belong to the state and not to the church. Church order grew out of the requirements of the eucharistic service.

But Sohm enrolled very few converts to his point of view immediately.

In the third chapter of his monograph, Linton deals with the newer verdicts on early ecclesiastical terms. The origin of the charismatic ministry consisting of apostles, prophets, teachers is now definitely allocated to Judaism. Apostle signifies an authorized, commissioned representative so that everything depends upon relationship to the one assigning the commission. The prophet was concerned with revelation, forecast of the future, and the discernment of men. Teachers were proclaimers of the word of God.

Hans Lietzmann has demonstrated that the Greek word for bishop had descriptive, not title value; its Christian content being pastoral leadership, conduct of worship, and management of charity. The idea of presbyter was derived from Judaism and its Christian content had to do with a kind of advisory board or the honored aged who sat around the altar table with the bishop. No technical significance attached to the term deacon. Its Christian content involved service in the cultus and participation in charity. Acts 6 does not call "the seven" deacons.

In the course of this research upon the origin of the church, the kingdom of God became an eschatological idea, the Spirit a supernatural, mysterious, inexplainable something, and the cultus an occasion and place where things happened. If Jesus believed in the imminent, heavenly kingdom of God, could he have been interested in a church? If enthusiasm and ecstasy characterized the life of the primitive church, how could there have been a fixed organization? If baptism and the eucharist were sacraments, how could they have been symbols?

This accumulation of data challenged scholars to new definitions of the church. When the approach is theological, the church is now often defined as a supernatural institute of salvation, as the people of God, as the body of bride of Christ, as the sphere of the Spirit's

activity. The church is not of this world but from above. "To be saved" is equated with "to join the church." The church is in direct opposition to the world.

When the approach is sociological, church may be defined as a religious fellowship under personal leaders or as a social institution *sui generis*.

When the approach is historical, much attention is again bestowed upon the historicity of Matthew 16:18 and 18:17. Where it is affirmed, the question as to when Jesus fulfilled this promise and built his church must be faced. Kattenbusch assigned the founding of the church to the last meal of Jesus with his disciples. But since this meal was merely a *kiddusch* and the breaking of the bread was not related to the death of Jesus by the Jerusalem church, this view must be rejected. Hence K. L. Schmidt concludes that Jesus founded the church but refuses to point out on what particular occasion.

Karl Holl observed two interpretations of the church in early Christianity, one supported by Jerusalem, the other by Paul. The Jerusalem church regarded itself as the mother church and centre of Christianity. The apostles viewed all new Christian communities as branches or mission stations of Jerusalem whose planting and training must be supervised, guided and controlled by Jerusalem. Paul also thought of the church as an institution into which individuals must be admitted, in which the apostles have special rank. Paul even acknowledged the overlordship of Jerusalem by visiting there, consulting the pillar apostles and accepting their decision and by gathering a collection for the saints of Judea, but on the other hand Paul undercut Jerusalem by emphasizing the centrality of the living Christ and the charisms of the Spirit, by describing the local congregation as a replica of the universal church, and by calling Gentile Christians, "saints."

The final chapter of this illuminating examination of the numerous problems connected with the origin of the church answers these fundamental questions: Does the idea of church exclude that of corporation; does the idea of church exclude that of organization; does the idea of Spirit exclude that of office.

The chief characteristic of the early church was a sense of fellowship with God and Christ. Every church was a totality, consisting of an advisory section of apostles and presbyters and the deciding people,

meeting, or congregation. Decisions of the church were valid only when in conformity to the will of God. A particular Christian community was autonomous only in the sense that it had the right to reach verdicts which had been ratified in the courts of heaven. No church could decide by majority vote what the will of God should be.

The universal church comprised all apostles, presbyters, and believers. Toward it any local group of Christians might sustain three relations. The local Christian community when engaged in worship considered itself a replica of the universal church, since the entire church was mystically present during the eucharistic service. When the local Christian group thought eschatologically, looking forward to the approaching unity in the supranatural, imminent kingdom of God, it felt itself to be one of the scattered churches of the diaspora, a fraction or part of the universal church. When the local church looked toward Jerusalem, it interpreted itself as an out-station of the mother church.

In all these instances, organization was inevitable, since worship demanded receivers of gifts, distributors of the elements, leaders in the eucharistic prayers. If the donations were to be properly distributed, particular persons had to be given special responsibility. Since Jerusalem sent investigating committees to newly established Christian churches, some sort of organization resulted. The general trend in organization was from the democratic-horizontal to the monarchical-vertical. The cult triumphed over the eschatological expectation.

The free Spirit, enthusiasm, and ecstasy of the early church soon made office necessary. Spiritual excesses and general chaos cured themselves by fashioning safety-devices against confusion. The spirits were tested by certain formulas. Moreover even spiritual deliverances become traditional. Originality turns into repetition. Some filled with the Spirit served as officers, understanding how to direct visions toward the attainment of purposes and practical ends.

The author has enumerated and interpreted the principal problems associated with the beginnings of the church very fairly. One is somewhat disappointed with his failure to appreciate more adequately the results of form-criticism and his support of the Kattenbusch-Schmidt theory, yet on the whole, the discussion issues in the discovery of the original church. With this perspective, denominational interpretations of the church appear too simple and too superficial. No creed or con-

fession of faith completely or perfectly defines the original church. Indeed, the meager data within the New Testament and its occasional nature make generalizations impossible. The net outcome ought not to be but probably will be that each denomination will continue its selective appeal to the New Testament in the attempt to support its existing organization by some proof texts without ever observing that this method demonstrates conclusively that there is no single church-pattern in the New Testament. *Semper, ubique, idem* cannot be affirmed of the original church. The search for unity in the record of the early church ends always in the discovery of variation. One also wonders why the church should continue to look only backward.

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The Chronicle of the Slavs by Helmold, priest of Bosau. Translated with introduction and notes by Francis Joseph Tschan. New York: Columbia University Press, 1935. Pp. xii + 321. $4.00.

We must be very grateful to the editors of the Records of Civilization, the Columbia University Press, and Prof. Tschan for making available in an English translation the Chronicle of the Slavs by Helmold, for this is one of the most important documents discussing the eastward advance of the Saxons against the Polabian Slavs, the last surviving remnants of which are the Lusatians or the Wends of the Spreewald and of the Lausitz areas in Germany. For several centuries the struggle for the Christianizing and the Germanizing of these tribes continued with various results, but over a long period of time it is evident that the eastward advance of the Germans and the Church was slowly but steadily being pressed successfully.

There were many reasons for this. The Slavs never secured a definite unity and the hopes of the Poles and the Czechs for adding them to their own territories never eventualized, largely because of the constant struggle between the two already civilized Slavonic tribes or nations, one without and one within the Holy Roman Empire. Helmold was a witness of much of this struggle particularly of the Saxon-Slav warfare and his work gives us much information about the struggle and the early life of the Slavs that is not contained elsewhere.

It is the more unfortunate, therefore, that the translation and notes

of Prof. Tschan do not give us any adequate idea of the Slavonic culture and civilization. The author follows in his introductory chapter the account of Peisker in the Cambridge Modern History. Peisker is perhaps the foremost exponent of the theory that the Slavonic mind and life was a tabula rasa when the tribes first came into contact with their neighbors to the north, south, east, and west. In the Revue des Études Slaves, Vol. II, pp. 19-37, Prof. Lubor Niederle criticizes in detail these views and points out that the Slavs, while a disorganized mass, could not be treated in the Peisker manner. The passage quoted by Prof. Tschan (page 5-6) adequately sums up this theory but it does seem probable that the Slavs did know agriculture, pasturage, and other arts at the earliest times.

We find the same confusion in the mind of Prof. Tschan and perhaps of Helmold, for the tribal names are not at all clear. We have lists of a large number with their special gods, but these lists either vary or are contradicted by the alliances of the Slavic princes with Saxons for their own purposes, and we do miss a definite endeavor to outline in the introduction the general location of the various Slavonic tribes. It is a very complicated subject but a use of the material already available in Polish and in Czech especially would have made the situation much clearer for the reader.

In the same way there is no comment on the very startling and perhaps true remark of Helmold (p. 45) that Hungary differs from Slavonia neither in customs nor in language. We may well ask if this means that in the twelfth century Slavonic culture predominated in Hungary. There are many reasons for thinking that this may have been true but the passage at least deserves a note.

In line with this we have a curious variation in the spelling of proper names. Thus he writes (p. 46, note 4), "Novgorod on the Wolchow River or with Ostrov above Pskov." All the v's and w's in these proper names represent the same Slavonic sound and the author should have adopted a uniform transliteration of the names instead of varying between the German and the English forms.

As regards the notes on the religion of the Slavs, they are of slight value and will throw no light upon any of the vexed questions of the Slavonic religious cults.

In a word the great defect of this volume is the lack of interest of the author (largely because of his failure to use extensively Slavonic

sources) in the political and social data concerning the Slavs which Helmold gives. The great asset of the book is the fullness of notes on the actions of the invading Saxons and above all there is the availability in good English and attractive form of one of the outstanding works on the Slavs of central Germany in the twelfth century. For that we can be more than grateful for the book.

CLARENCE A. MANNING

Columbia University

The Catholic Eastern Churches. By DONALD ATTWATER. Milwaukee: The Bruce Publishing Company, 1935. Pp. xx + 308. $3.00.

This is a very valuable book, for it is perhaps the only source in English for a knowledge of the various groups in the East of Europe and in Asia that have accepted the Papacy while retaining the basic rites and ceremonies and customs of the native Churches. As such it is to be sincerely welcomed, and it belongs in the library of all those who are interested in the religious developments in the Orthodox area.

The author is an enthusiastic admirer of these Churches which include about 8,000,000 adherents, and he supports all those efforts of the various Popes which tend to maintain the Eastern rites within the bosom of the Roman Catholic Church. Yet he does not try to deny that there has been a continuous pressure toward latinizing in almost all of these groups, and that this pressure has been exerted by important dignitaries of the Church as well as by the more unthinking masses. This is particularly evident in regard to the celibacy of the clergy, and the difficulties of the married Ruthenian priests in the United States and Canada are a striking example of this. Nevertheless, everywhere the contact of these Eastern rites and the usual Latin system has made difficulties which have been magnified or reduced, depending upon the tact of the leaders of both sides and the relative equality in culture, wealth and influence of the two groups.

In estimating the relations between the Latin rite, the Papacy, these Churches and the Orthodox groups from which most of them separated, we may be doubtful as to whether the judgment of history will agree with that of the author in all cases. Nevertheless we must remember that to the author the authority of the Pope is a matter of faith, and that he is writing for his coreligionists. Any attempt to criticize this point of view would therefore result in a discussion of the

entire problem of the Pope and the Eastern Churches and, in a review of this length, this would be superfluous.

Perhaps the historical notes in connection with the various Churches may be more open to criticism. Thus the author is violently prejudiced aaginst the Poles for their attitude toward the Ruthenians and the Russians (cf. pp. 80 ff, 128). There is certainly much to be said for the Polish attitude, and the whole problem of the Ruthenian-Ukrainian movement in both its political and religious connections is still fundamentally unsolved. The author here as elsewhere has accepted the point of view of the people of the Eastern rite without checking it with history. Sometimes, perhaps usually, he is right. At other times he is unfair and his book gives a partisan opinion. Similarly in regard to the Bulgarians. He states, "The Slavs, too, had a hand in the conversion of the Bulgarians" (p. 121). On the other hand, competent scholars deny that there is a single Turanian word left in Bulgarian from the original language, and some have even argued that the Bulgarians perhaps spoke Slavonic before they entered the Balkans. For all practical purposes the fusion of Bulgarians (the Turkic people) and the Slavs took place before the introduction of Christianity.

These, however, are really minor defects and when we compare them with such splendid chapters as that on the Eastern Catholics, (pp. 25ff) and the great mass of material which is here made available for really the first time, we can be very grateful for the book and to the author for the way in which he has sought to present his subject to the average English and American reader.

Clarence A. Manning

Columbia University

Die Anthropologie Martin Luthers: eine philosophische Untersuchung. By M. A. H. Stomps. Frankfurt: Klostermann, 1935. Pp. 153. RM 6.

There has been something like a renaissance of Luther study in Germany since the World War—not merely out of historical interest in the great reformer, but out of a sense that his less well-known works, written as they were in troublous times, might have light and strength in them for our own troubled era. During the last few years there has also been a concentration of attention among European theologians upon the much-neglected subject of the Doctrine of

Man—due in part at least to the rapid deflation of human self-confidence since the War, which has led to the revival of pessimistic views about human nature. The present volume on Luther's Anthropology unites both of these contemporary interests, and should be of use at the Oxford (Stockholm continuation) Conference on Life and Work in July, 1937, where the Doctrine of Man, in its relation to the problem of Church and State, is to be a principal subject of discussion.

The author calls his work a "philosophical inquiry," but by this he means simply an attempt to state systematically and objectively the content of Luther's teaching about man, as found in scattered passages of his Bible commentaries and polemical writings. Luther's teaching is described with great scholarly care and attention to detail, the essential passages being pretty fully quoted in the original Latin or German. Some of the principal findings of this very careful study may be briefly stated:

1. Luther's teaching falls within the framework of the Biblical view of man as a created being (*ens creatum*). He accepts the general implications of this view as developed by the early Fathers up to St. Augustine: that God created man out of nothing (*ex nihilo*), in the divine image (*ad imaginem*), to the end that man might find his blessedness (*beatitudo*) in eternal union with God, so far as this is possible for a temporal creature (*cum tempore creatus*).

2. Luther breaks sharply with the mediaeval scholastic doctrine of man. In a key passage of his commentary on Romans (8: 19ff) he scornfully contrasts the "quiddities and qualities," the "essence, accidents and operations," the "actions, passions and movements" which are all that Aristotle and his scholastic disciples can see in man, with the Apostle's vision of man's "expectation." The point is that Man's true nature to Luther is not his *present* nature, which can be empirically observed and philosophically analyzed, but his *future* or *ideal* nature, which is visible only to the eye of the religious seer. While Luther uses to some extent the language of mediaeval psychology in dealing with human nature, and speaks of man's "intellect," "will," "senses," "mind," etc., he does so almost invariably in an altered and figurative sense, so as to convey a moral or religious meaning. An interesting concluding chapter on "Luther's Terminology" makes this very clear.

3. The main positive teaching of Luther concerning human nature falls into three divisions: man's original righteousness (*justitia*) before the Fall: his present unrighteous state (*injustitia*), and the transformed state which redeemed sinners may know even now (*justitia peccatoris*) while they look forward to that completely renewed humanity of which they may have only the "expectation" in this life. All three divisions relate themselves closely, of course, to Luther's central doctrine of "justification by faith"; and on all three topics Luther has a wealth of penetrating moral and religious insights, reminding one of the great discussion of the "Greatness and Wretchedness of Man" in Pascal's *Pensées*. If it be asked how Luther could have "insight" into man's state before the Fall, the answer is simple: by thinking away those very precise characteristics which make man now a sinner. So even with regard to Adam in Eden, Luther is a shrewd observer, and his portrait of Man deserves discussion at least as much as Pascal's, La Rochefoucauld's, or Hobbes' more celebrated diatribes on the same subject. Stomps has done us all a great service in making this obscure and scattered material available in systematic form.

WALTER M. HORTON

Oberlin College

The God Who Speaks. By BURNETT HILLMAN STREETER. Warburton Lectures, 1933-35. New York: Macmillan, 1936. 216 pages. $1.75.

This book by the Provost of the Queen's College, Oxford, has the ring of dealing with reality for which the author's writings are noted. Its content combines an impressive range of historical knowledge with a critical discussion of current questions; from a comparison of early Hebrew literature with that of other ancient peoples, concise summaries of biblical books, to comments on communism and an examination of religious experience in the light of modern science and psychology. But this widely assembled material is all utilized to illustrate and to enforce the one theme of the book, that God speaks to men.

The recognition that God makes Himself known to men is the essential characteristic of religion. It is this definiteness which gives distinction to the biblical records. Without this basic conviction, "the word God is likely to degenerate into a name given to a 'sort of a something,' a vast vagueness—for some merely awful, for others benevo-

lent but too hazy to affect practically the conduct of everyday life" (p. 1). The belief that God has a purpose which men can know and serve needs to be revitalized, the reasons for holding it tested and verified, that their actions may be brought into accord. Such belief can overcome the feeling of "world-despair which has gradually invaded the human race as a result of the World War, and the years of progressive chaos which have followed" (p. 11).

If God speaks to men and has a purpose for them, how may His purpose, for the individual as well as for society, be known? To this question Provost Streeter replies that while the full use of the intellect is demanded, a further requirement is "through a re-orientation of purpose and desire, and a constant re-dedication of the self to the highest that it knows" (p. 3). With these conditions fulfilled, he holds "we should expect to find that, at a certain point of spiritual development, the personality will become sufficiently sensitive to the influence of the Divine to reach an awareness of God's will which may find expression through a voice within" (p. 3).

Testimony to this "voice within" with its implications for individual conduct and for an ethically re-ordered society is conspicuously found in the Old Testament prophets. Jesus as portrayed in the Gospels proclaimed and devoted His life to the will or purpose of God in the coming of the Kingdom. The speeches and writings of Paul show his obedience to vision and his new insight into the supreme worth of charity or love.

In interpreting the significance of the biblical records, a description is given of the manner in which the sayings of Jesus were compiled (p. 111 ff.), with a discussion of the similarities and differences between Jesus' teaching and that of the Apocalyptists (p. 121 ff.). A striking statement is that "Christ's emphasis on the idea of God as Father was a corrective of an over-insistence on the Divine Transcendence by some of the Rabbis" (pp. 149-151-152), which would suggest that Provost Streeter does not agree with a similar over-emphasis in the theology of Barth and his followers. The Gospel of John is regarded as correcting and also fulfilling "the expectation expressed in the earlier Gospels and Epistles of Christ's visible return on the clouds of glory in the Apocalyptic symbol" (p. 145). "John loosed it (Christianity) from servitude to Apocalyptic literalism" (p. 147).

It is evident that the author is strongly attracted to the Oxford

Group. (The designation, Oxford, is used without quotation marks.) According to report he has identified himself with this Movement; and the argument in his book may be taken as an exposition of its underlying convictions and practices. Particular attention is thus directed to "guidance." God has a purpose and a plan—"not only for the world, but for every individual in it, and for the minutest details in the life of every individual" (p. 10, p. 159 ff.).

Provost Streeter is fully aware of the dangers and difficulties to be met in holding the belief that such specification is given. Defenses must be erected "against haphazard suggestions from the depths of the subconscious, and against the boundless capacity for self-deception inherent in the human heart" (p. 168). Citing the prophets and Paul, he finds the criteria in the moral content, in a reference to the judgment of qualified associates, and in the ethical action that follows—"by their fruits ye shall know them."

Candid and discriminating as is Provost Streeter's position, the argument for detailed direction does not seem convincing, nor is it free from confusion. In one place it is said we should expect the action of the Divine spirit upon man "not to supersede, but to stimulate his highest powers, and to result in an enhancement of his profoundest insights" (p. 59). "Again, it is possible that certain other cases of guidance should be referred to that instinct for right decision in complex practical issues and difficult circumstances which business men call *flair*—only intensified and given a higher sense of direction by the inspiring effect of conscious contact of the human personality with the divine" (p. 164). It is pointed out that "in science the flash of discovery, the first glimpse of an hypothesis, has close analogies to what in art and religion we speak of as inspiration" (p. 31). But these instances are quite different from the specification of "the minutest details in the life of each individual." Are they less valid and valuable?

That God has a purpose for men, individually and socially, which they can know and which all their activities are to serve, is undoubtedly a fundamental religious belief, and one of far-reaching, transforming effect. Further, such purpose or plan must be "for a world of free individual souls" (p. 13); for the development of "that essential freedom and spontaneity which constitutes the fine essence of human personality" (p. 18). Is that "fine essence" then to be taken away by the minutest specification of what one shall do? Is not the exercise of judg-

ment to one's best capacity and conscience, with a complete loyalty of will, indispensably a part of the purpose itself, and a prime requisite to its fulfilment? The author seems to believe that a discarded dictation theory, which long obscured the truth of the Bible, is now to be accepted in another form.

A remarkable chapter has the heading, "To the Rescue of Reason." The revolt from reason, which seeks to justify itself in the findings of modern psychology, is one of the most disturbing features of the present time. "The eighteenth century thought of itself as the age of Reason, the last half of the nineteenth as the age of Reasonableness. The present is coming near to being the age of Unreason" (p. 180). Unconscious desires and merely emotional appeals, practically eliminated as a distorting influence in the field of pure science, are powerful "in political and other questions where personal interests and emotions are involved." How is this disastrous trend to be corrected? There was a time when the champions of reason and intellectual freedom had to oppose religion—or rather those representatives of religion who "confused its essence with traditional views of history or theological definitions." Now religion can make amends and contribute the service of upholding reason. It is to do so by overcoming the "ego-centricity of man—by inviting him to become the willing instrument of an Eternal Purpose, and then by giving him the insight and the power to be this. So long as a man's hopes, desires, and fears are primarily egocentric, it is impossible for him to take an objective view, not merely of the comparative rightness of different lines of conduct, but even of their practicability. For the capacity of weighing evidence and estimating probabilities is conditioned by the degree to which a man has achieved the disinterestedness which at least desires to see things as an impartial intelligence would view them" (p. 182).

The variety of topics discussed (there is a supplementary chapter on "Christianity and Other Religions") tends to produce a discursive effect. Nevertheless, the principal aim is clearly stated, and skilfully woven so as to reappear in many different patterns. The outstanding scholarship of the author, the vigor of his presentation, and the relevance of his main discussion to matters about which people are thinking, make this a book of unusual and stimulating interest.

Raymond C. Knox

Columbia University

American Philosophies of Religion. By Henry Nelson Wieman and Bernard Eugene Meland. Chicago and New York: Willett, Clark and Company, 1936. Pp. xiii + 370. $3.00.

This is an interesting analysis of contemporary tendencies in the philosophy of religion among Protestants in the United States. Roman Catholics, Anglo-Catholics and Jews are not included. The names of fifty-seven philosophers are listed in the table of contents, and separate accounts, some necessarily brief, are given of thirty-five of them.

The authors have certainly made a conscientious attempt to give accurate and sympathetic accounts of the different points of view. They naturally have been most successful in interpreting the writers who have most in common with themselves. As Professor Wieman is one of the most prominent of contemporary exponents of the philosophy of religion in this country, and Professor Meland is his pupil, their evaluations of the other workers in this field will be read with general interest.

It cannot be said that the attempts at classification are altogether satisfactory. Each philosopher is assigned to one of four historical traditions in which his thoughts are claimed to be "rooted," although it is conceded in the Preface that no representative of any of these traditions is consistent with it (page viii), and the exposition that follows makes it evident that scarcely any philosopher is much concerned with the maintenance of any tradition. It would seem better to have classified the philosophers with reference to their fruits than their supposed roots. The four major traditions are Supernaturalism, Idealism, Romanticism, and Naturalism, and those thought to be rooted in each of these traditions are further subdivided in a manner that at times appears arbitrary. On the whole, the authors must be convicted of using "philosophy as the art of affixing labels," a practice against which the late Professor James Edwin Creighton vigorously protested in a paper read before the eastern division of the American Philosophical Association (published in the *Journal of Philosophy* in the volume of 1920, pp. 225-233; cf. pp. 643 f.). While the authors are careful never to impute to any philosopher a position that he does not hold, they sometimes throw into undue prominence those features of his thought which correspond to the label which they have attached to him, giving his views a different perspective from what he would

himself have chosen. Consequently the book is less reliable as a report of contemporary American Protestant philosophies of religion than the volumes of *Contemporary American Theology*, edited by Vergilius Ferm, in which each contributor gave an account of the development of his own thought in his own way, disclosing the sources—intellectual, traditional, environmental, temperamental and other—of which he was himself conscious.

The chief value of the book under review, therefore, is the disclosure of how the other philosophies of religion are oriented with reference to that of Professor Wieman, and their respective merits when thus considered. The reader is accordingly advised to begin his study of the volume at page 295, with Professor Meland's account of Professor Wieman. He will observe that Wieman thinks of himself as "rooted in the tradition of Naturalism," belonging to the particular species of Naturalists here denominated "empirical theists." The other "empirical theists" are Edward Scribner Ames, John Dewey, Shailer Mathews, Gerald Birney Smith, and B. E. Meland.

In Meland's account of Wieman we are told that Wieman is a "naturalistic theist" who differs from Ames, Dewey, and Mathews "in that he pursues the empirical path to the end of its trail," with the result that "God is actually an object of experience, apprehended and discerned as any other object in environment." This view ascribes to God "dynamic participation in the spatial world. God *is* and *moves* in our midst in discernible ways." (Italics Meland's.) While Wieman with strict adherence to observation and reason has established the existence of God (in what is apparently meant to be a realistic sense), Wieman has arrived at "no final definition of God, except the minimum statement that God is the supremely worthful for all mankind." Wieman refuses to attribute personality to God. Meland apparently believes that Wieman has come to the only sound conclusions which philosophy by the use of strictly scientific methods has thus far been able to reach concerning God.

Accepting Wieman's philosophy of religion as the norm, other "empirical theists" like Dewey, Ames, and Mathews are right in starting with the experience of value, and in recognizing an independently existing reality of which God is a symbol; they err in making God merely a symbol instead of an actual constituent of this reality. The species of Naturalists most closely related to the "empirical the-

ists" are the "religious humanists" (M. C. Otto, R. W. Sellars, A. E. Haydon); these are farther off the track because they reject God altogether, even as a symbol, although they deserve praise for their naturalistic and humanistic approach to religion. The "cosmic theists" (A. N. Whitehead, F. C. S. Northrop, *et al.*) are another species of Naturalists; they share with the "empirical theists" and the "humanists" the virtue of "stricter adherence to the scientific method in developing their view of the supreme reality which concerns religion" than is true of any other philosophers of religion (p. 229). The "cosmic theists" are regarded by our authors with high respect on account of their acquaintance with the sciences and their use of scientific methods; they are highly praised and never directly criticized; yet the implication would seem to be that they are too speculative in their metaphysics, and ought not, in the light of the evidence, to have come to more affirmative conclusions than those of Wieman and Meland. All of the groups thus far mentioned rank above the remaining type of Naturalists, the "evolutionary theists" (J. E. Boodin, W. P. Montague, R. L. Calhoun, H. W. Wright, W. K. Wright) who are accused of using the findings of science to support beliefs which they had previously held on religious convictions devoid of scientific justification (pp. 213, 229); yet even this group deserve to be classified as "Naturalists," and on the whole they are treated sympathetically, and commended for their large use of science, for instance in their interpretations of emergent evolution.

Much further removed from the "naturalistic theism" of Wieman are the philosophers "rooted in the tradition of Romanticism." (This group seems to consist of thinkers who do not readily fall into any of the others. Many of them think of themselves as realists. Probably none of them will have imagined that he would ever be called a Romanticist until he reads this book.) The Romanticists are subdivided into "aesthetic naturalists" like Santayana and H. B. Alexander, to whom religion is chiefly art and poetry, and "ethical intuitionists" (D. C. Macintosh, E. W. Lyman, William Adams Brown, W. M. Horton, *et al.*) who rely mainly upon religious experience and moral imperatives, and only accept the "facts" of science in a gingerly way (p. 151). Some of the "ethical intuitionists" however, deserve praise for rejecting the "unfounded optimism" of many liberals (p. 155), for "facing squarely the facts of evil" and for practical interest in

social amelioration. The best of them keep "fully informed upon what is occurring in science and philosophy" and are "quick to welcome whatever gives promise of aid to the moral, religious enterprise of human living" (p. 158).

Still more alien to "naturalistic theism" are the philosophers "rooted in the tradition of Idealism." Despite an obviously sincere effort to be fair, the authors fail to make clear why Absolute Idealism has been an inspiration to many minds, and was long the prevailing philosophy in this country. They succeed better in interpreting the Mysticism of Rufus M. Jones. While unable to give a very clear account of Personal Idealism in general, they at least do justice to E. S. Brightman by inserting an extended and appropriate quotation from him in the chapter on Personalism, and including a contribution by him in the Symposium at the end of the volume.

Furthest of all Protestants from "naturalistic theism" are of course the philosophers "rooted in the tradition of Supernaturalism." These are subdivided into "traditional supernaturalists" and "neo-supernaturalists." Among the former, Professor J. Gresham Machen is chiefly mentioned, and of the latter George W. Richards and Reinhold Niebuhr are the Americans discussed. Little good is found in "traditional supernaturalism," and its affinity with the Roman Catholic Church and the Middle Ages is affirmed in a manner not intended to be complimentary. While of course the admission of anything supernatural is ruled out by the philosophy of Wieman, certain of the neo-supernaturalists are found to deserve commendation for their willingness to accept the results of the higher criticism and their interest in social reconstruction.

The book closes with an interesting Symposium upon "the present outlook in the philosphy of religion." G. W. Richards, as a supernaturalist, believes that in the future as in the past, men will always need to repent of sin and look to God through Christ for forgiveness. E. S. Brightman expects "a decline in the importance and authority of individual thinkers and even of 'schools'—be they naturalistic or idealistic. What is to be hoped for above all is an increase in cooperative labor on the task of interpreting religion, such as is exemplified in the present volume. Without any arbitrary compromises or sacrifices of individual conviction a new truth may gradually be discerned, larger and more inclusive than any present insight" (p. 325). D. C. Macintosh believes that in religion we must seek for empirical knowl-

edge of God, trusting to the subjective certitude of our religious intuitions, but testing them scientifically and practically whenever we can. E. S. Ames calls attention to the more affirmative note in the latest pragmatism, exemplified by Dewey's *A Common Faith*, in which a new and vital conception of God is announced and the basic error of atheism is exposed. This newest tendency in pragmatism is also welcomed by B. E. Meland, who thinks that pragmatism "may turn the naturalistic outlook more and more toward ideal and liberal ends." He believes that neo-supernaturalism is having a revival, that idealistic influences will persist under other circles and associations, and that religious realism will make a contribution to the future. H. N. Wieman thinks that it is now evident that one may continue to be a Christian whether he is a naturalist or a supernaturalist. "The religious person who is informed can today go all the way over into naturalism or all the way over into supernaturalism without experiencing any religious difficulties with science" (p. 344). The various specialized sciences, as they are becoming more mature, are dealing with organic connections and becoming more hospitable to the interests of religion. The general conclusion of the symposium and of the volume as a whole is favorable to the future prospects of religion.

WILLIAM KELLEY WRIGHT

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The Reception of the Egyptian Cults by the Greeks (330-30 B.C.). By THOMAS ALLAN BRADY, Ph.D., comprising vol. 10, no. 1 of the University of Missouri Studies, University of Missouri: Jan. 1, 1935. Pp. 88.

This monograph is a study of the times and places of the adoption of Egyptian cults by Greek speaking persons in Egypt or elsewhere in the Mediterranean during the Hellenistic age; it assumes a general knowledge of the matter and the manner of these cults, and is concerned only slightly with the spiritual or ethical values but very much with the moments when a cult rises, and where and how it progresses.

We are reminded by the author that visits of Greeks to Amon's shrine in Africa, and the coming of Isis to Athens through Egyptians settled in the Peiraeus preceded the contacts of Alexander's followers with cults in Egypt itself; but that from the time of Alexander's death more and more Greeks appear in the worship of Egyptian di-

vinities, and the rituals of these divinities spread rapidly over the Aegean. Greeks at Memphis now combine Osiris and Apis in a cult of Osorapis, which is to develop at Alexandria as the cult of Sarapis and become the favored and favoring cult of the ruler and the Ptolemaic official class. It is for this Alexandrine cult, established about 280 B.C., that Demetrius of Phaleron is supposed to have supplied a Greek ritual. As this cult continues, Isis is included in the worship as the wife of Sarapis, as she had been the wife of Osiris before. The veneration of the ruler is a part of this cult and the deification of the ruler after death follows; Arsinoe, wife of the second Ptolemy, was after her death identified with Isis, or with Aphrodite, and worshipped appropriately. As the Greeks, out of faith or policy, attach themselves to this cult of the ruling class, Sarapis receives characteristics of Greek healing and saviour gods, with a Hellenic emphasis upon health and prosperity in this world, as well as trust in the hereafter, which had been a traditional part of the Osiris worship.

This worship of Sarapis by some Greeks, or many, does not displace the Greek gods; temples to Zeus, Pan, Demeter and Nemesis appear still, especially in the reclaimed Lake Moeris district when Ptolemy II settles a Greek and Macedonian colony there. This juxtaposition of Greek and Egyptian worships results in the inclusion of Isis, Osiris, and Sarapis in the Olympian pantheon, and in the hellenization of these gods in figure and meaning as they enter Greek temples; it results also in a Greek's being able to worship Zeus when in Olympia and Hera at Samos and yet build a temple in Egypt to Isis and Anubis. Meanwhile, the native Egyptians for the most part have little to do with the Sarapis cult, and continue their traditional forms of the Isis and Osiris worship.

Outside in the Aegean the cult of Sarapis in the third century spreads to Delos, Miletus, Halicarnassus, Euboea, Athens, Thera and Cnidus, in some instances bringing Isis there for the first time, in others finding that Egyptians had already established her on Greek soil. In the latter case the separate cults of the Egyptian Isis and the Hellenized cult of Sarapis might continue to exist independently in the same place.

The creation and expansion of the Sarapis cult, and the interest of Greeks and Egyptians in each other's rituals, are followed by a reaction in the late third and the first half of the second century B.C.

When the fourth Ptolemy took large numbers of native Egyptians into his army, he seems to have given Egyptians a new confidence in themselves, and a new and proud hostility toward the dynasty and the Greek population. The Greek response to this attitude is diplomatic; the worship of Isis grows more popular and the cult of Sarapis is submerged; the worship of the ruler, not a strange thing to Egyptians, remains and strengthens. And an effort is now made to popularize the identification of Greek and Egyptian divinities: Apollo, the wolf god, is identified with Anubis, the jackal god; Dionysus, the saviour, with Osiris the saviour. Small cult societies flourish, and in these Greeks and Egyptians combine or confuse their divinities. Ptolemy tries to convince the Jews that Sabaoth and Sabazius, a ritual name for Dionysus, are the same; but here he has little success. In the Aegean, Egyptian cults continue to spread, and Sarapis appears, in the late third and the second century, in Thasos, Tenos, Samos, Cos, Lesbos, in Phocis, and Thessaly, and in the Peloponnese at Epidaurus, Methana, Phigalea, and Mantinea.

In the second half of the second century, and from then on till Augustus, we see in Egypt a continued identification of Greek and native divinities, the lesser gods as well as the great divine figures now being accepted by Greeks; private religious clubs in the heterogenous armies have Egyptian, Greek, Persian and Semitic soldiers, and in these groups all the gods exchange or add attributes. A very important feature at this time is the re-emergence into power of the native temples, whose traditional influence had been checked by the Ptolemies; we now find the rulers not only allowing this revival but even bidding for the favor of the temples and granting them the rights of "asylia," by which the temples could harbor fugitives from imperial justice. The worship of Isis, the cult in which the Greeks and the natives could best understand each other, gains in importance in Egypt and abroad. Sarapis goes with her into the Aegean (Cyzicus, Priene, Magnesia on the Maeander); and in the west Puteoli, Pompeii and Rome receive the eastern cults.

This narrative of the development of Greek interest in Egyptian religion concludes with a statement not so safe or so well documented as the preceding pages: "By the time of Augustus, the cult of Sarapis and Isis had spread throughout all Greece and remained the dominant cult there, very probably, until displaced by Christianity."

Following the narrative matter is an appendix, giving for the periods under discussion names of places where shrines of Isis and Sarapis have been found, a list of temples of Egyptian gods in Egypt with which Greeks were in some way concerned, and a list of the shrines of Egyptian gods in the Greek world of the east, and in Magna Graecia in the west. A second appendix recovers the names of 1324 Greek speaking persons who came into close association with Egyptian cults in the Hellenistic age. A map which forms a frontispiece to the volume shows the location of shrines of Isis and Sarapis in the Mediterranean world.

By the aid of literature, inscriptions and papyri, this study attempts to date closely the rise and progress of Egyptian cults among Greeks in the Hellenistic period; and it is a valuable hint that concern with religious values should rest upon a knowledge of when a cult develops, why it appears, and how it flourishes or dies. A cult of Isis was not the same in all times and places or at all times in any one place; we must know also, if possible, whether a cult is a private or state one, whether it adopts a local or foreign priesthood, where the emphasis is within the ritual, and what sort of persons found or enlarge it. These things it is impossible to know perfectly, but Mr. Brady sifts a good deal of evidence and different interpretations of it to give facts which help to establish limits.

This work was originally a thesis for the doctorate at Harvard. As a thesis it makes no claim to rounding out the subject of Greek relations with Egypt and religion there. Mr. Brady hints at pre-Hellenistic connections; these connections were older and more interested than his hints might lead us to suppose, and the reader should fit this study into a larger background if the matter here discussed is to be well understood. Homer had been acquainted with the reputation of Egypt's culture; and the wise men of Greece were often thought to have owed their learning in part to Egyptian wisdom; from the seventh century, trade with Egypt was constant, and Greek colonies were located along the Nile; in the sixth century Greek mercenaries were numerous in Egyptian armies, and, in the other direction, part of the money to rebuild the temple of Apollo at Delphi, burned in 548 B.C., came from Amasis. Solon gathered from Egypt part of his code of laws, and Hecataeus and Herodotus were greatly impressed with the religious traditions of this older civilization and

tried to connect them with Greek antiquity. It was this long acquaintance of the Aegean wth Egypt which made the Ptolemies less strange in Egypt than they would have been had Alexandria been bringing together peoples who had never mingled.

It must be realized, too, that the Hellenistic acceptance by Greeks of Egyptian cults, and particularly of the cult of Sarapis, was the accepting of features common to many Hellenistic cults in Greece itself, and not the adoption of a strange foreign religion. Greece at this period was deeply concerned with the place of the individual in a widening world, and religion had to have something to offer those who were losing faith in local cults and their state rituals under the influence of cosmopolitan culture; two seemingly unrelated but similarly helpful supports came at this time, the mystery cult, and the worship and deification of a local hero or ruler. Both of these appeals are in the Sarapis cult and ally it with the worships of Demeter, Dionysus, Adonis, and the later Heracles, on the one hand, and with the deification of rulers such as Lysander and Demetrius Poliorketes on the other.

The discovery of a statuette of Anubis in the excavations in the agora at Athens last winter (A.J.A. vol. XL No. 2) after Mr. Brady's work appeared offers new archaeological data to Hellenistic evidence already collected.

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World Fellowship. Addresses and Messages by leading spokesmen of all Faiths, Races and Countries. Edited by Charles Frederick Weller. New York: Liveright Publishing Corporation, 1935. Pp. xviii + 986. $3.00.*

Fellowship is susceptible of varying degrees of intimacy, and, in a loose sense, I suppose, what is exhibited in this volume might be called "fellowship." But the phrase "friendly comparison of convictions" (p. 526) is a more accurate description. On the whole these exhibits

* A second congress of the World Fellowship of Faiths was held in London, July 3-18, 1936, and its proceedings have been published in a 500 page volume entitled *Faiths and Fellowship* (London, 1936). This congress was less spectacular and more scholarly. The papers read, are, many of them, contributions in special fields by noted scholars, among them Professors S. N. Das Gupta, Sir S. Radhakrishman, Louis Massignon, D. T. Suzuki, E. J. Marcault, and Nicolas Berdiaeff.

from the Chicago World's Fair resemble more the "parade of rival religions" (p. 10), as the Parliament of Religions at the World's Fair of 1893 is here described, than it is intended to. It is true the tone of rivalry has largely disappeared, but not that of self-sufficiency. A faith, by its very nature, seeks followers, not fellowship with other faiths. The fact that there is less rivalry indicates therefore not more unity but more respect for geographical boundaries. The idea that "the world is my parish" seems to be yielding to the admission that a faith is after all limited in space and tme, the faith of a group engaged not so much in expressing once more what is common to all faiths, as in promoting distinctive ideals suggested by particular circumstances. We have here, therefore, a typical World's Fair exhibit: various faiths, torn from their native roots and arranged more or less artfully in a series to make an entertaining show for curious visitors and an opportunity of self-display for the representatives. To call this "World Fellowship" is but one further trick of showmanship.

The decline in missionary aggression and invasion is the religious aspect of the breakdown of world markets. It is not mere tolerance that is expressed here, it is a frank admission that "God hath not left himself without witness in any land," an admission of the relativity of revelation. This is clearly a departure from the syncretism of the Brahmo-Samaj, which still finds occasional echoes, to a recognition that, though not all religions have the same God, all have common tasks, each in its own field. And although even the most charitable man of faith inevitably retains something of the feeling expressd by the the old story, "You are doing the Lord's work in your way and I in His," on the whole the various faiths here represented are more concerned over their common problems than over the oneness of God. These problems are conceived in secular terms. The word "faiths" is substituted for "religions" purposely to include those moral, political and economic convictions that are dominating various groups and peoples today, though they are not commonly called religions. The hope of the organizers of the Congress was that the various faiths might focus their attention on their common problems of war, poverty and prejudice, and make a practical contribution to their solution.

Such hopes were, of course, doomed to disappointment, for no one could really expect such a parliament to do serious work. The Congress well illustrates the penerating remark made by one of its leaders,

the Maharaja Gaekwar of Baroda, when he said (p. 7), "Where the hymn says that Brahmins were the mouthpiece it has been interpreted to mean that they are the brain." This exhibit of the world's faiths is negligible as a piece of brain work, but it is significant as an excellent mouthpece. Brahmins and other ministers of peoples and their gods are indeed inclined to forget that their function is less that of solving the world's problems than of stating them. A religion is a technique for expressing faith; when alive, it is not so much the opium as the mouthpiece of the people. Now, to bring all the mouthpieces of the world together and to hear the overpowering, confused blare is a terrifying and wholesome experience, which no visitor to the World's Fair should have missed and which is well worth the price of this book. One acquires a deep sense of the suffering of the God who must continually hear "the voice of humanity." Even after much ingenious "organizing" some of the section headings still run as follows: "Section VII. Machines. Fear. Security. Adult Education. Prohibition. Motion Pictures." "Section XI. Africa. Central and South America. China. Germany. Italy. Korea. Norway. Russia. Six Balkan States." "Section XIV. Baha'i. Buddhist. Catholic—Roman and Liberal. Some Other Christian Contributions." What a Tower of Babel we still are! Not only is the confusion of tongues bewildering, but the welter of enthusiasms is disillusioning. What is *any* faith among so many?

Dr. Huh Shih, certainly one of the most brilliant men of the many brilliant participants in this Congress, confesses his personal faith that "no effort is in vain." He infers this from the proposition that "no event is without consequences." His dubious logic here is matched by his unconquerable faith. When nothing is vanity, faith is easy. But if we take the more conventional conception of vanity and admit that undesired consequences are the defeat of an effort, it seems inevitable on the face of it that the great majority of faiths here represented must be in vain. The life of faith must be willing to face such risks. These faiths, therefore, each struggling to make itself heard in the universal Babel, are a tribute to human energy rather than to human intelligence. The apparent conviction of the promoters and editors that a genuine harmony of sounds, a universal idealism, united all these motifs into a concordant unity, merely adds one more to the marvels of faith.

There is one note, however, sounded occasionally, which suggests

a negative kind of unity—a fellowship of fear. Dr. Neander quotes the Jesuit Father, Max Pribilla: "Let us pay more regard to truth *intra et extra muros*, ere bolshevism devour us all" (p. 504). And Professor Anesaki writes: "Both religions [Buddhism and Christianity] are facing a common foe, both in idea and life, in the rise of materialism, which means the sway of commercialism, the spread of the exploiting spirit, the growth within the Oriental nations of class hatred, as well as the aggrandising commercial power of the Western nations, all of them tending to the neglect of Christian or Buddhist principles and to the decline of religious life in general." (p. 506) This sense that secular faiths and war-like faiths may triumph over the religious faiths of peace and good-will, really gives the key to what fellowship there is among religions. They all feel insecure and there is a trace of fear in their huddling. Contemporary religious faiths are clearly on the defensive. The gesture of including in their parliament some of the secular faiths whom they fear makes the atmosphere of fellowship all the more tenuous.

World fellowship is still physically impracticable. It is a real service, none the less, to collect the faiths of the world and hold them up to view each other. This constructs comparatively few "bridges of understanding across the chasms of prejudice," but it engenders much humility. Nothing is so humiliating and salutary to a faith as to see itself among others. For, whether two faiths on meeting agree that they share the truth or persist each in claiming exclusive possession thereof, they will never join hands. The best they can do is to shake hands and depart in peace. In this way, to be sure, they lessen one great cause of war by cooling the fires of "invincible" faith with an occasional draught of good fellowship.

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BOOK NOTES

A Dictionary of Religion and Religions. By RICHARD INCE, M.A. Camb. London: Arthur Barker Ltd., 1935. Pp. vii + 294. 9/—.

To condense a dictionary of religion into the brief compass of less than 300 pages is a task of no mean skill, and one which the author has, in the main, performed admirably. The definitions are apt, and a great service is rendered by the use of references to standard works for many of the more important subjects. At the risk of being dubbed what the author calls a "flea-hunter" the present reviewer would humbly suggest that, since the work is a *dictionary*, and not an encyclopœdia, would it not be better if some of the definitions were not so long? For instance, CHRISTIANITY, a word whose meaning is generally understood, is given almost two pages which might better be devoted to some of the saints whose names are omitted altogether, such as St. Birgitta of Sweden, the Little Flower, St. Therèse of Lisieux, St. Sebastian, and St. Catherine of Siena. Also it is a bit difficult to understand why valuable space should be wasted on such words as AESTHETICS, CRUELTY TO ANIMALS, CAPITAL PUNISHMENT, CRIME AND PUNISHMENT, DEBUNK, and FUGUE, which have little or no direct relation to religion. But in spite of these minor defects Mr. Ince's work should be included in any library where students are in need of a handy reference work. M. B.

The Hindu-Muslin Problem in India. By CLIFFORD MANSHARDT. London: George Allen and Unwin Ltd., 1936. Pp. 128. 5s.

There is need for such a study as this by someone who is close to the Indian situation and yet not exactly of it. Dr. Manshardt, who is a social worker of some years experience in Bombay, and something of an antiquarian, supplies us with a concise yet comprehensive account of the Hindu-Muslin tension. Brief surveys of the historico-cultural backgrounds of both the Hindus and the Muslins make up the first two chapters. The contemporary problem is then stated under three heads, which deal with the social and religious, the economic, and the political causes of tension. As an illustration of conflict in action, he describes, in some detail, the Bombay riots of 1929, with which he was in active contact. He stresses the fact of tension, indicates something of the latent forces involved, and shows how both communities are dominated by their past political and religious ascendencies.

The author's solution of the problem is not novel but obvious, and is the common property of the best minds on both sides,—mutual understanding and good will, and national and political, rather than communal realignments.

There are Indians who would say that he has over simplified the picture; that, in isolating the two communities for the purpose of his study, he has not sufficiently recognized the significance of the British occupation as engendering conditions in which differences are perpetuated. The "Communal Award" is a case in point. They would also say that in drawing upon situations in the West, as, for example, in his references to the Negro-White problem in the United States, he has overlooked significant facts.

The book, however, is a fair and concise statement of the case on both sides, and supplies an illuminating exposition, such as is needed in this country, of the Hindu-Muslin conflict. G. W. B.

A Search in Secret India. By PAUL BRUNTON. With a Foreword by Sir Francis Younghusband. New York: E. P. Dutton & Co., Inc. 1935. Pp. 312. $3.50.

The Secret Path: A Technique of Spiritual Self-Discovery for the Modern World. By PAUL BRUNTON. New York: E. P. Dutton & Co., Inc. 1935. Pp. 222. $2.00.

These two books owe much of their interest to the fact that they were written, not by a scholar in the academic sense of the word, nor by a believer in the occult, but by a journalist trained in the hard-bitten school of sceptical fact-finding, and trained to accept a *fact* when it presents itself, free from preconceived theory. So much that is written about the mysterious East is warped in judgment by either a too-eager will-to-believe, or an equally uncritical determination to deny the validity of any experience which does not lend itself to materialistic explanation. The "Believe it or not" school of journalism, which backs up its wonders with a factual guarantee, is perhaps better equipped to deal with India than the "a priori" school of dogmatic amateur science. Mr. Brunton wisely merely records his experiences and seldom tries to explain them, either by materialistic or supernatural causes. He is quite willing to accept the possibilities of trickery or hypnotism in a great many cases, but not in all. There were some which he simply has to put down as inexplicable, but still, *facts*.

But the most interesting and significant thing is the author's own reaction to the procession of yogis, swamis, rishis, fakirs, and wonderworkers whom he encountered, and his final conversion from complete scepticism to a profound belief in the reality of the spiritual life of at least a few of them. The final adventure of his search is a deeply moving account of the psychological drama which takes place when a sincere seeker finds a true teacher, and surrenders all his doubts for the sake of a great pragmatic test. The practical result of this great adventure is given to us in *The Secret Path*, a simply written text book in the practice of meditation especially designed to meet the needs of the Occidental. There is no doubt that the East *has* something of value to offer the West in exchange for our science, and that something is *Yoga*. Not that the Christian mystics have not already

given us the techniques of the way of contemplation, but that unfortunately they have given it to us so intertwined with a theology which we no longer accept, that their instruction is useless to us. The practice of Yoga as outlined by Mr. Brunton, makes no demands on credulity. It offers itself as a purely pragmatic enterprise, an experiment which is certain to work if the requisite conditions are met. M. B.

Das Bild Christi im Wandel der Zeiten. Einhundertsieben und dreissig Bilder auf 112 Tafeln gesammelt und mit einer Einführung sowie mit Erläuterungen versehen. VON HANS PREUSS. Leipzig: A. Deichertsche Verlagsbuchhandlung D. Werner Scholl, 1932. Pp. 148. Mk. 2.85.

Christ in Recent Art. Sixteen Pictures by Artists of International Repute. A fresh and modern appraisal of Spiritual Values. Picture Interpretations by ALBERT EDWARD BAILEY. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1935. $1.50.

The purpose of these two quite dissimilar collections of pictures is the same, namely, to show how the person and life of Christ have been interpreted by artists in the technical and spiritual mediums of their own times, and to give the student of religion a deeper insight into the psychological aspects of Christianity. There is no more direct road into the deepest emotional aspects of a religion than through its art, for the artist is not hampered by intellectual concepts like the theologian. It is his privilege to express the truths of his religion in the ancient language of symbolism, using even the human forms and scenes symbolically. It is for this reason that the most satisfactory forms of religious art are those in which the subject is represented as a universal type instead of as an illustration of a particular event in time and space.

The German publication, both by means of a scholarly introduction and an intelligent choice of examples, illustrates clearly the passage from symbolism to realism and back again toward symbolism in the 20th century. Beginning with a catacomb fresco of the third century representing Christ as the Good Shepherd, it gives us the classical, youthful Christ so clearly derived from Greek art. It is strange that the early Christians who were suffering persecution and martyrdom for their religion should have thought of their Saviour, not as the Man of Sorrows, the First Martyr suffering death for them, but as a beardless boy, a youthful Dionysos, an Apollo "ever young and fair." But by the sixth century, under the Byzantine influence, an entirely new Christ had appeared,—a solemn, bearded figure with great burning eyes full of sorrow, and by the commencement of the Middle Ages the Crucifixion had become the favorite subject. From now on the element of suffering becomes more and more predominant. The great wooden crucifixes, the Pietàs, Mantegna's appalling "Man of Sorrows," the terrible realism of the German and Flemish passion scenes culminating in the Isenheim Altar of Grünewald and the woodcuts of Dürer,—all produce an

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effect of almost unbearable pity and awe. It is Michelangelo who returns us to a Christ too great for pity, and Rembrandt who transfers the pity to the frail humanity surrounding a majestic Saviour.

The American work confines itself entirely to examples of 19th and 20th century art, because, in the author's words, "They are the reflection of the modern mind, an indication of the modern man's reaction to traditional religious material." This modern religious art is not ecclesiastical, and concerns itself, not with the traditional subjects on which the dogmas of the Incarnation, Atonement and Redemption are based, but with subjects which deal with human relationships. "Modern art concerns itself with the middle rather than the ends of his life, with his ministry, with his mature character and work, or with those universal truths that make him the interpreter of life today. This emphasis is something new in art, not much over fifty years old." It is a pity that in this useful endeavour to give us the Christ of today in the mind of the artist so many examples should have been chosen from the sentimental, realistic German School of the 19th century, Gebhardt, and Uhde especially. But we are grateful for the inclusion of the exquisite "Jesus and the Children," by Odette Pauvert, Franz von Stuck's "Crucifixion" with its stunning composition and terrifying effect, and the beautiful "Tree of Life" by Burne-Jones. The usefulness of the collection is greatly enhanced by notes telling where photographs and lantern slides of each picture may be procured. We should like to see a second and larger edition of the portfolio including works by Maurice Denis, L'Hermitte, Dagnan-Bouveret, Holman Hunt, and our own LaFarge, Daingerfield, and Epstein. M. B.

L'Itinéraire et l'idéal monastiques de saint Augustin. By M. MELLET. Paris: Desclée de Brouwer et Cie., 1934. Pp. x + 150. 10 francs.

The author, a Dominican Friar, outlines, on the basis of his lectures in a monastery of his Order, St. Augustine's progress toward the monastic life and the cardinal principles of his Rule. Inspired at an early age by the *Hortensius* of Cicero, by the eremitic monasticism of St. Anthony of Egypt, and by the coenobitic system of Italy, his spiritual journey is traced through Cassiciacum and Thagaste to Hippo, where his own Rule was to be fully developed. Combining manual toil, meditations, and devotions; providing a regular clergy both for the monastic life and for parochial guidance; adaptable to the individual needs of every member of the Order—the Augustinian Rule has inspired those of the Premonstratensians, the Trinitarians, the Servites, and—above all—the Dominicans, to say nothing of modern Orders, such as the Little Brothers of the Sacred Heart of Jesus. The booklet does not profess to be an exhaustive study of its theme; but as a survey inspired by deep knowledge of its subject and by profound devotion, it deserves all commendation as an introduction to one of the manifold types of Christian monasticism. L. H. G.

La Geste des martyrs. By Father Pierre Hanozin, S. J. Paris: Desclée de Brouwer et Cie., 1935. Pp. 267.

A translation of thirty-one *acta sincera* of martyrs from the reign of Antoninus (138-161) to that of Galerius Maximinus and Licinius (305-323). The latest and best editions of these 'acts' have been conscientiously followed; and of them all but four (Potamiana and Basilides [pp. 90-92], Karpos, Papylos, and Agathonike [pp. 120-125], Konon [pp. 134-138], and Apphianos and Edesios [pp. 238-244]) had already been selected by the Benedictine Ruinart in his *Acta primorum martyrum sincera et selecta* (2d ed., Amsterdam, 1713). Fr. Hanozin has adhered strictly to the canons of hagiography laid down by the Bollandists; and the differences between the simple *acta sincera* and the elaborate character of so many later 'acts,' with their accretion of fictional incidents and their suspicious lack of detail in points of historic importance, is strikingly implied in this collection. The reason for the difference is plain: the *acta sincera* seek to record history; the others aim at edification—the divergency is much the same as that between the canonical and the 'apocryphal' New Testaments. This does not mean that an *actum sincerum* may not be written at any time; indeed, the modern *procès-verbaux* for the canonisation of any saint give, in essence, the material for such an 'act.' The 'apocryphal' *acta*, where most searching criticism is necessary to separate the spurious from the true, are the type more popularly known by the general public, where they have gained an undue supremacy both for good with the simple and uncritically devout, and for evil with the scoffer and the unsympathetic. It was an excellent idea to make the chief *acta sincera* accessible in convenient form and in a modern vernacular; and one may hope that this version in French will be followed by one in English, so that intelligent laymen may have an opportunity to see what an *actum sincerum* really is, and to contrast it with the 'apocryphal' type. L. H. G.

Von Hügel and the Supernatural. By A. Hazard Dakin, Jr. London: Society for Promoting Christian Knowledge, 1934.

Mr. Dakin's book provides a competent short cut to acquaintance with Baron Von Hügel's philosophy, the salient points of which are outlined under six topics. The first of these is the Baron's epistemological position of Critical Realism, against the background of which are presented the subsequent sections on Intimations of the Supernatural, Religion, Mysticism, and doctrines concerning God and Man. That the Baron, writing at a time when great emphasis was laid upon epistemological problems, was forced to delineate his own views is evident; but to take his theories concerning knowledge as something basic, to which the bulk of his religious philosophy had to be consistent, is to distort their proper position as ideas which grew out of his main philosophical interests, and which expressed the latter and defended them from the attacks of current epistemological

systems. Moreover, Mr. Dakin seems to be disturbed by the lack of a detailed and exhaustive theory of knowledge upon the sure foundations of which the Baron could raise his doctrines concerning the supernatural; a lack which, on the contrary, indicates that Von Hügel, keenly aware of the living reality of the religious life for some men, felt no need of any further basis or justification for it, although any serious philosophical treatment of it naturally led to the outlining of an epistemology broad enough to include the material dealt with. Mr. Dakin is well aware of this sweeping character of the Baron's philosophy, and almost every page indicates some difficulty or problem which Von Hügel would have met had he worked his generalizations out in detail. Mr. Dakin has made small attempt to trace the development of Von Hügel's thought or to analyse the problems from which it grew; rather he has gathered together the dispersed hints and passages, filled in the gaps from the work of men with whom the Baron was in sympathy, and presented the whole in a unified and compact form, meticulously pointing out the abundance of difficulties ignored by Von Hügel's sweeping method and contentment with obscurities. If in so doing, however, he has lost much of the powerful spirit and suggestiveness which constitute the Baron's greatest contribution, it is perhaps due to the fact that Von Hügel's writings themselves raise more problems than they solve.

W. J. L.

A Way to Life. By Ernest Fremont Tittle. New York: Henry Holt and Co., 1935. Pp. xii + 183. $1.75.

The Ayer Lectures delivered at the Colgate-Rochester Divinity School in April 1935. In these inspiring lectures the author deals with such pertinent questions as our need for faith in God and man which alone can give us a sense of security in this all too uncertain world. He attacks Barthianism because it destroys our faith in man and the social gospel. It is the philosophy of desperation and defeat denying all hope of a better world here and now. The author finds that modern man is no longer a rebel against authority. He yields to dictatorships and the claims of the totalitarian state, and in religion he is seeking some sort of authority to which he can bow. He turns with pathetic eagerness to any scientist of repute who ventures to state his belief in some sort of meaning and purpose in the universe, and he looks with nostalgic eyes at the calm certainties of Catholicism. But on the positive side the modern man is feeling more and more that the life of religion is not one which can be lived with God alone, it must also include one's fellow man. The problems of war and poverty and disease are social problems and must be attacked collectively. Individualism is in disrepute. We all admit our moral responsibilities for social wrongs. Dr. Tittle ends with a plea for a "Christian internationale whose objective shall be the building of a great age, a Christian civilization, the kingdom of God." The only hope of building up such an organization lies in that small, devoted minority whom Plato and Isaiah call "the remnant," but they must be

organized, disciplined, and directed toward the one great objective, the building of the Kingdom of God on earth. M. B.

The Esoteric Tradition. By G. DE PURUCKER. 2 vols. Point Loma, Calif.: Theosophical University Press, 1935. Pp. xvi + 1109 + 71 (index). $5.00.

Dr. de Purucker's exhaustive work is written from the point of view of an orthodox theosophist who believes in the existence of a Brotherhood of Great Seers and Sages who have actually existed on this earth "for many millions of years—certainly for not less a period of time than twelve million years; in other words, since the beginning or appearance on Earth of the great Body-Race or Root-Race which preceded our own present Fifth Root-Race of humans" (p. 1045). He accepts the existence of the continent of Atlantis without question, and the writings of H. P. Blavatsky as authoritative. Her position in relation to the Great Brotherhood was that of "Messenger," or "minor avatara," through whom one of the Great Teachers spoke. The Ancient Wisdom, or Esoteric Tradition, is the root religion from which all the great religions sprung, and of which they are merely misunderstood and degenerate symbols. A true understanding of this "Wisdom of the Gods" may be acquired from *The Mahatma Letters to A. P. Sinnett,* and *The Secret Doctrine,* both of which are actually the products of "lofty Mahâtmic minds."

In early chapters the author expounds the teachings of the Mystery religions of the Greco-Roman world, esoteric Christianity, and esoteric Buddhism, as parts of the Ancient Wisdom, pure in their origin, but gradually becoming corrupt through human frailty and superstition. His exposition of the doctrines of reincarnation and karma is full and logical. It is easy to see how such a conception is more satisfying to the human longing for perfect justice in the universe than any other teaching regarding the hereafter. In it there is no need for a delicate and difficult balance between Divine Justice and Divine Mercy. The laws of spiritual cause and effect simply work automatically, and God is absolved from all responsibility—it is almost too simple. It leaves nothing unexplained—no "problem of evil," no mystery, no need of faith, in fact, no need of religion at all. It makes of the universe a mechanism as perfect as a Ford factory. Is the whole system a gigantic "wish-fulfillment," almost too good to be true? Or is it merely boring in its "explain-it-all" perfection? The answer is a matter of individual temperament.

In its treatment of modern science the book is distinctly patronizing. We are told that our own achievements are insignificant in comparison with ancient races. The *vimânas,* or "vehicles of the gods," referred to in the Hindu epics were actual flying machines, and the "gods" themselves were "men who were god-like in their intellectual and therefore scientific accomplishments." (P. 51.) (One wonders why the "flying-machines" are to be taken literally, but not the "gods"!) We are informed that "so-called

'primitive man'—who, indeed, has never existed as he has been pictured except in the minds of Western theorists—who indeed, was a highly civilized and sophisticated human, was universally of the conviction that the fabric of the Universe is, as said above, of septempartite or indeed of decempartite character." (P. 132.) The modern theories of evolution are quite wrong in tracing the descent of man from the primitive mammalia—in fact, it is the other way around—the mammalia are degenerate descendants of early human stock. (Pp. 317 ff.) But fortunately modern science is becoming more and more "mystical," and eventually will arrive at the true, i.e., Theosophical, view of the universe. Millikin, Eddington and Jeans are already well on the way. In fact Jeans, in his *The Mysterious Universe* (p. 83), has already corroborated a statement made by Madame Blavatsky in 1888 "that what we call our physical universe is but condensed or concreted or crystallized light." (Pp. 459.) Jeans' statement reads: "These concepts reduce the whole universe to a world of light, potential or existent. . . ." M. B.

Our Lady in Art. Annotations and descriptions by the Right Reverend David T. O'Dwyer. Vol. 1. Washington, D.C.: The Salve Regina Press, 1934. Pp. 61.

This charming small volume in gray and gold, published at the National Shrine of the Immaculate Conception in Washington, consists of fifty-five reproductions of famous paintings, eight of which are in color, depicting the Blessed Virgin. In general the selection is a good one, though there are many important omissions which may be supplied in a second volume still to come. Forty-five of the illustrations are from the Italian Schools, leaving a meager balance of ten for all other schools of painting. Of these two are German, five Flemish, and three Spanish. It seems a pity that the French painters, especially Fouquet, should have been omitted altogether. There is also a regrettable over-balancing of subjects, fifty of the selections being representations of the Madonna and Child, which produces an effect of monotony in the book. It is to be hoped that in future volumes Father O'Dwyer will include some of the exquisite Annunciations, Nativities, Adorations of the Magi, Presentations, etc., in which the art of painting is so rich. Such a collection would be of value to the student of art as well as to the devout Catholic. The annotations in the present work are written with rare appreciation and knowledge, and admirably serve their function of illuminating the inner meanings of the artist's conception of his subject. M. B.

La Femme et Dieu. By Giorgio Quartara. Paris: Librairie Felix Alcan, 1935. Pp. viii + 334. 25 fr.

A vitriolic attack upon the Christian religion with special respects to

the Catholic Church, marred by quite unnecessary vulgarity and a complete lack of philosophical understanding of the doctrines attacked. Only five of the book's fourteen chapters deal with the subject, "Woman and God," the rest being devoted to such miscellaneous subjects as, "The Non-Existence of Jesus Christ," "The Eucharist and the Mass, Anthropophagous Rites," "Christian Atrocities," and "The Concordats, the Law of Guarantees," etc. The author revels in detailed accounts of the worst tortures of the Inquisition as applied to its female victims, and in equally nauseous eulogies of the religion of Venus as practiced by the enlightened pagans. However, one is forced to admit that the array of quotations from Papal Encyclicals on the subjects of marriage, birth control, illegitimacy, the laws governing surgical practice in childbirth, etc. *do* warrant something of the indignation so bitterly expressed by the author. In his eagerness to prove his thesis that Christianity has enslaved woman, he completely overlooks the fact that it was the monastic orders which gave her a refuge from marriage not of her own choosing, freedom from the burdens of motherhood, and a chance to develop her own talents and powers quite independent of masculine interference. Certainly such women as Catherine of Siena, Hilda of Whitby, and Teresa of Avila found their great opportunity and their emancipation in the very bosom of the Church. A fair idea of the character and contents of the book may be gained from its first and last sentences. "It is necessary to destroy Christianity in Europe and in the two Americas, not only because it is a false and absurd religion, but because it is the most dangerous and the most injurious to the human race." . . . "Oh! Venus, thou alone art divine!" M. B.

Contemporary Christian Thought. By CHARLES S. MACFARLAND. New York: Fleming H. Revell, 1936. Pp. viii + 204. $1.50.

This is a collection of brief book reviews. The reviews make no pretense at systematic criticism, but they reflect the sober judgment of a man of long experience and generous interests. For the most part the books reviewed are very recent indeed, so that this volume makes a useful guide to current theological and ecclesiastical literature in American protestantism.

The Nature of Religion. By EDWARD C. MOORE. New York: The Macmillan Co., 1936. Pp. ix + 368. $2.50.

A running commentary on the history and institutions of Christianity by a careful historian and thoughtful preacher. His chief theme is that religion is a life which can be understood better by its examples or illustrations than by formal definition or philosophy. The last section, "Reality and Realization," is a sketchy discussion of the relations between religion, art, morality, and science.

The Modern Goliath. By MILTON ANDERSON. Los Angeles: David Press, 1935. Pp. 91. $1.50.

A plea for the subjugation of the motion picture giant in the interests of religious education.

The Accuracy of the Bible: The Stories of Joseph, the Exodus and Genesis, Confirmed and Illustrated by Egyptian Monuments and Language. By A. S. YAHUDA. New York: E. P. Dutton & Co., Inc., 1935. Pp. xxxvii + 226. $3.00.

An attempt to prove the historicity of the first two books of the Bible by the findings of archaeology written in popular style.

Social Ethics of the Jews: with Selected Texts from Biblical and Talmudic Literature. By ARTHUR MEYEROWITZ. New York: Bloch Publishing Co., 1935. Pp. 104. $1.25.

The author states in the preface that "The purpose of this volume is to provide in condensed form a survey of Jewish ethics governing the life of man in his relation to the individual and to society." An impressive selection of quotations from texts dating from approximately 1000 B.C.-600 A.D.

Sabbath and Festival Addresses. By REV. DR. M. HYAMSON, B.A., LL.D. New York: Bloch Publishing Co., 1936. Pp. 205. $3.00.

Les Exercices Spirituels: Textes Pontificaux. Annotés par Albert Valensin, S.J. Paris: Desclée de Brouwer, 1935. Pp. xiv + 192. 10 fr.

A collection of Pontifical Texts grouped together on the basis of subject matter dealing with the use of "Spiritual Exercises" in the life of the church.

Holy Hour. By FATHER ISIDORE O'BRIEN, O.F.M. Paterson, N.J.: Saint Anthony Guild Press, 1932. Pp. 165.

Devotional essays on various subjects.

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Bible vs. Modernism; A Compendium of Sundry Hypotheses and their Refutation. By ALLISON N. TICE and CHARLES H. ROBERSON, B.S., M.A. Rock City Publishing Co., 1935. Pp. 289 + xxvii (Index). $2.00.

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